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We provide explicit solutions for government spending multipliers during a liquidity
trap and within a fixed exchange regime using standard closed and open-economy
models. We confirm the potential for large multipliers during liquidity traps. For
a currency union, we show that self-financed multipliers are small, always below
unity. However, outside transfers or windfalls can generate larger responses in out-
put, whether or not they are spent by the government. Our solutions are relevant
for local and national multipliers, providing insight into the economic mechanisms at
work as well as the testable implications of these models.
1 Introduction
Economists generally agree that macroeconomic stabilization should be handled first and
foremost by monetary policy. Yet monetary policy can run into constraints that impair its
effectiveness. For example, the economy may find itself in a liquidity trap, where inter-
est rates hit zero, preventing further reductions in the interest rate. Similarly, countries
that belong to currency unions, or states within a country, do not have the option of an
independent monetary policy. Some economists advocate for fiscal policy to fill this void,
increasing government spending to stimulate the economy. Others disagree, and the is-
sue remains deeply controversial, as evidenced by vigorous debates on the magnitude of
fiscal multipliers. No doubt, this situation stems partly from the lack of definitive empir-
ical evidence, but, in our view, the absence of clear theoretical benchmarks also plays an
important role. Although various recent contributions have substantially furthered our
understanding, to date, the implications of standard macroeconomic models have not
been fully worked out. This is the goal of our paper.
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We solve for the response of the economy to changes in the path for government
spending during liquidity traps or within currency unions using standard closed and
open-economy monetary models. A number of features distinguish our approach and
contribution. First, our approach departs from existing literature by focusing on fiscal
multipliers that encapsulate the effects of spending for any path for government spend-
ing, instead of solving for a particular multiplier associated with the expansion of a single
benchmark path for spending. Doing so provides insight into the economic mechanism
for the effects and delivers results on the varying effectiveness in the timing—back load-
ing versus front loading—for stimulus plans. Second, we obtain simple closed-form so-
lutions for these multipliers. These help uncover the precise mechanisms underlying the
effects of fiscal policy and allow us to deliver several new results. Third, we investigate a
sharp contrast between the liquidity trap and currency union cases. We isolate the crucial
role that outside transfers can play and we compute the corresponding transfer multipli-
ers. Finally, we consider non-Ricardian effects by studying a version of the model with
liquidity constrained consumers. This extension may be especially relevant for the re-
cent downturn, which is widely associated with a sharp disruption in financial and credit
markets, followed by a slow recovery featuring household deleveraging. Throughout, we
draw implications for recent empirical studies on national and local multipliers.
Our results confirm that fiscal policy can be especially potent during a liquidity trap.
The multiplier for output is greater than one. The mechanism for this result is that gov-
ernment spending promotes inflation. With fixed nominal interest rates, this reduces real
interest rates which increases current spending. The increase in consumption in turn leads
to more inflation, creating a feedback loop. The fiscal multiplier is increasing in the de-
gree of price flexibility, which is intuitive given that the mechanism relies on the response
of inflation. We show that backloading spending leads to larger effects; the rationale is
that inflation then has more time to affect spending decisions.
In a currency union, by contrast, government spending is less effective at increas-
ing output. We show that consumption is depressed, so that the multiplier is less than
one. Moreover, price flexibility diminishes the effectiveness of spending, instead of in-
creasing it. We explain this result using a simple argument that illustrates its robustness.
Government spending leads to inflation in domestically produced goods and this loss
in competitiveness depresses private spending. Applied to current debates in Europe,
this highlights a possible tradeoff: putting off fiscal consolidation may postpone internal
devaluations that actually help reactivate private spending.
It may seem surprising that fiscal multipliers are necessarily less than one whenever
the exchange rate is fixed, because this contrasts sharply with the effects during liquidity
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traps. Our analytical approach allows us to uncover the crucial difference in monetary
policy: although a fixed exchange rate implies a fixed nominal interest rate, the converse
is not true. Indeed, we prove that the liquidity trap analysis implicitly combines a shock
to government spending with a one-off devaluation. The positive response of consump-
tion relies entirely on this devaluation. A currency union rules out such devaluations,
explaining the negative response of consumption.
In the context of a currency union, our results uncover the importance of transfers
from the outside, from other countries or regions. In the short run, when prices haven’t
fully adjusted, positive transfers from the rest of the world increase the demand for home
goods, stimulating output. We compute “transfer multipliers” that capture the response
of the economy to transfers from the outside. We show that these multipliers may be large
and depend crucially on the degree of openness of the domestic economy.
Outside transfers are often tied to government spending. In the United States federal
military spending allocated to a particular state is financed by the country as a whole.
The same is true for exogenous differences in stimulus payments, due to idiosyncratic
provisions in the law. Likewise, idiosyncratic portfolio returns accruing to a particular
state’s coffers represent a windfall for this state against the rest. When changes in spend-
ing are financed by such outside transfers, the associated multipliers are a combination
of self-financed multipliers and transfer multipliers. As a result, multipliers may be sub-
stantially larger than one.
Finally, we explore non-Ricardian effects from fiscal policy by introducing hand-to-
mouth consumers. We think of this as a tractable way of modeling liquidity constraints.
In both in a liquidity trap and in a currency union, government spending now has an
additional stimulative effect. It increases the income and consumption of hand-to-mouth
agents. This effects is largest when spending is deficit financed; indeed, the effects may
in some cases depend entirely on deficits, not spending per se. Overall, although hand
to mouth consumers introduce an additional effect most of our conclusions, such as the
comparison of fiscal multipliers in a liquidity trap and a currency union, are unaffected.
Related literature. Our paper is related to several strands of theoretical and empirical
literatures. We will discuss those that are most closely related.
We contribute to the literature that studies fiscal policy in the New Keynesian model
in liquidity traps. Eggertsson (2011), Woodford (2011), Christiano et al. (2011), show that
fiscal multipliers can be large at the zero lower bound, while Werning (2012) studies op-
timal government spending with and without commitment to monetary policy. Gali and
Monacelli (2008) study optimal fiscal policy in a currency union, but they conduct an
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exclusively normative analysis and do not compute fiscal multipliers. The results and
simulations reported in Corsetti et al. (2011), Nakamura and Steinsson (2011), and Erceg
and Linde (2012) show that fiscal multipliers are generally below one under fixed ex-
change rates yet higher than under flexible exchange rates (away from the zero bound),
somewhat validating the conventional Mundell-Flemming view that fiscal policy is more
effective with fixed exchange rates (see e.g. Dornbusch, 1980). Our solutions extend these
results and help sharpen the intuition for them, by discussing the role of implicit de-
valuations and transfers. Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007) introduce hand-to-mouth
consumers and study the effects of government spending under a Taylor rule in a closed
economy. Our setup extends such an analysis to liquidity traps and currency unions in
an open economy.
Our paper is also related to a large empirical literature on fiscal multipliers. Estimat-
ing national fiscal multipliers poses serious empirical challenges. The main difficulties
arise from the endogeneity of government spending, the formation of expectations about
future tax and spending policies, and the reaction of monetary policy. Most of the liter-
ature tries to resolve these difficulties by resorting to Structural VARs. Some papers use
military spending as an instrument for government spending. The relevant empirical lit-
erature is very large, so we refer the reader to Ramey (2011) for a recent survey. Estimating
fiscal multipliers in liquidity traps is nearly impossible because liquidity traps are rare.
The closest substitute is provided by estimates that condition of the level of economic
activity. Some authors (see e.g. Gordon and Krenn, 2010; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko,
2012) estimate substantially larger national multipliers during deep recessions, but the
magnitude of these differential effects remains debated (see e.g. Barro and Redlick, 2009).
States or regions within a country offer an attractive alternative with plausible exoge-
nous variations in spending. Indeed the literature on local multipliers has recently been
very active, with contributions by Clemens and Miran (2010), Cohen et al. (2010), Ser-
rato and Wingender (2010), Shoag (2010), Acconcia et al. (2011), Chodorow-Reich et al.
(2011), Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2011). These
papers tend to find large multipliers. Our paper helps interpret these findings. Govern-
ment spending at the local level in these experiments is generally tied to transfers from
outside. It follows that these estimates may be interpreted as combining spending and
transfer multipliers, as we define them here.
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2 A Closed Economy
We adopt a continuous time framework. This is convenient for some calculations but is
completely inessential to any of our results.
We consider a one-time shock to the current and future path of spending that is real-
ized at the beginning of time t = 0 that upsets the steady state. To simplify and focus on
the impulse response to this shock, we abstract from ongoing uncertainty at other dates.1
The remainder of this section spells out the standard New Keynesian model assump-
tions; readers familiar with this setting may wish to skip directly to Section 3.
Households. There is a representative household with preferences represented by the
utility function ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
G1−σt
1− σ −
N1+φt
1+ φ
]
dt,
where Nt is labor, and Ct is a consumption index defined by
Ct =
(ˆ 1
0
Ct(j)
e−1
e dj
) e
e−1
,
where j ∈ [0, 1] denotes an individual good variety. Thus, e is the elasticity between
varieties produced within a given country.
Households seek to maximize their utility subject to the budget constraints
D˙t = itDt −
ˆ 1
0
Pt(j)Ct(j)dj +WtNt +Πt + Tt
for t ≥ 0 together with a no-Ponzi condition. In this equation, Pt(j) is the price of domestic
variety j, Wt is the nominal wage, Πt represents nominal profits and Tt is a nominal lump
sum transfer. The bond holdings of home agents are denoted by Dt and the nominal
interest rate for the currency union is denoted by it.
Government. Government consumption Gt is an aggregate of varieties just as private
consumption,
Gt =
(ˆ 1
0
Gt(j)
e−1
e dj
) e
e−1
.
1Since we are interested in a first order approximation of the equilibrium response to shocks, which can
be solved by studying the log-linearized model, the presence of ongoing uncertainty would not affect any
of our calculation or conclusions (we have certainty equivalence).
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For any level of expenditure
´ 1
0 PH,t(j)Gt(j)dj, the government splits its expenditure across
these varieties to maximize Gt. Spending is financed by lump-sum taxes. Ricardian equiv-
alence holds, so that the the timing of these taxes is irrelevant.
Firms. A typical firm produces a differentiated good with a linear technology
Yt(j) = AtNt(j),
where At is productivity in the home country.
We allow for a constant employment tax 1 + τL, so that real marginal cost deflated is
given by 1+τ
L
At
Wt
Pt . We take this employment tax to be constant in our model. The tax rate
is set to offset the monopoly distortion so that τL = −1ε .
We adopt the standard Calvo price-setting framework. In every moment a randomly
flow ρδ of firms can reset their prices. Those firms that reset choose a reset price Prt to
solve
max
Prt
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρδs−
´ s
0 it+zdz
(
Prt Yt+s|t − (1+ τL)Wt
Yt+s|t
At
)
where Yt+k|t =
(
Prt
Pt+k
)−e
Yt+k, taking the sequences for Wt, Yt and Pt as given.
2.1 Equilibrium Conditions
We now summarize equilibrium conditions for the home country. Market clearing in the
goods and labor market
Yt = Ct + Gt,
Nt =
Yt
At
∆t,
where ∆t is an index of price dispersion ∆t =
´ 1
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−e
. The Euler equation
σ
C˙t
Ct
= it − pit − ρ
ensures the agents’ intertemporal optimization, where pit = P˙t/Pt is inflation.
The natural allocation is a reference allocation that prevails if prices are flexible and
government consumption is held constant at its steady state value G. We denote the
natural allocation with a bar over variables.
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We omit the first-order conditions for the price-setting problem faced by firms here.
We shall only analyze a log-linearized version of the model which collapses these equi-
librium conditions into the New Keynesian Phillips curve presented below.
3 National Multipliers in a Liquidity Trap
To obtain multipliers we study the log-linearized equilibrium conditions around the nat-
ural allocation. Define
ct = (1− G)(log(Ct)− log(C¯t)) ≈ Ct − C¯tY
yt = log Yt − log Y¯t ≈ Yt − Y¯tY gt = G(log Gt − log G) ≈
Gt − G
Y
where G = GY . So that we have, up to a first order approximation,
yt = ct + gt.
The log linearized system is then
c˙t = σˆ−1 (it − pit − r¯t) , (1)
p˙it = ρpit − κ (ct + (1− ξ)gt) , (2)
where σˆ = σ1−G , λ = ρδ(ρ+ ρδ), κ = λ(σˆ + φ) and ξ =
σˆ
σˆ+φ . Equation (1) is the Euler
equation and equation (2) is the New Keynesian Philips curve. Here r¯t is the natural
rate of interest, defined as the real interest rate that prevail at the natural allocation, i.e.
equation (1) with ct = 0 for all t ≥ 0 implies it − pit = r¯t for all t ≥ 0.
It will prove useful to define the following two numbers ν and ν¯ (the eigenvalues of
the system):
ν =
ρ−√ρ2 + 4κσˆ−1
2
ν¯ =
ρ+
√
ρ2 + 4κσˆ−1
2
.
If prices were completely flexible, then consumption and labor are determined in ev-
ery period by two static conditions: the labor consumption condition and the resource
constraint. Spending affects the solution and gives rise to the neoclassical multiplier 1− ξ,
which is positive but less than 1 and entirely due to a wealth effect on labor supply.
From now on we take as given a path for the interest rate {it} summarizing monetary
policy. To resolve or sidestep issues of multiplicity one can assume that there is a date
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T such that ct = gt = pit = 0 and it = r¯t for t ≥ T.2 A leading example is a liquidity
trap scenario where it = 0 and r¯t < 0 for t < T. However, although this is a useful
interpretation but is not required for the analysis below.
Remark 1. Suppose cT = 0 for some date T, then
ct =
ˆ T
t
(it+s − pit+s − r¯t+s)ds
so that given the inflation path {pit} the consumption path {ct} is independent of the
spending path {gt}.
This remark highlights that the mechanism by which government spending affects
consumption, in the New Keynesian model, is inflation which affects the real interest
rate. One can draw two implications from this. First, other policy instruments that affect
inflation, such as taxes, may have similarly policy effects. Second, empirical work on
fiscal multipliers have not focused on the role inflation plays and it may be interesting
to test the predicted connection between output and inflation present in New Keynesian
models.
3.1 Fiscal Multipliers Solved
Since the system is linear it admits a closed form solution. We can express any solution
with government spending as
ct = c˜t +
ˆ ∞
0
αcsgt+sds, (3a)
pit = p˜it +
ˆ ∞
0
αpis gt+sds, (3b)
where {c˜t, p˜it} are equilibria with gt = 0 for all t. We focus on the integral term
´ ∞
0 α
i
sgt+sds
for i = c,pi as a measure of the effects of fiscal policy g 6= 0. We assume the integrals are
well defined, although we allow and discuss the case where it is +∞ or −∞ below.
Focusing on consumption, we call the sequence of coefficients {αcs} fiscal multipliers.
Note that they do not depend on calendar time t, nor do they depend on the inter-
est rate paths {it} and {rt}. Thus, the impact on consumption or output, given by the
2Note that T may be arbitrarily large and will have no impact on the solution provided below. Indeed,
the characterization of the equilibrium is valid even without selecting an equilibrium this way: one just
interprets c∗ and pi∗ below any equilibrium in the set of equilibrium attained when gt = 0 for all t. The
solution then describes the entire set of equilibria for other spending paths {gt}.
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term
´ ∞
0 α
c
sgt+sds, depends only on the future path for spending summarized weighted
by {αcs}.
There are two motivations for adopting
´ ∞
0 α
c
sgt+sds as a measure of the impact of
fiscal policy, one more practical the other more conceptual:
1. The more practical motivation applies if the economy finds itself in a liquidity trap
where interest rates immobilized at zero, at least for some time. Fiscal multipliers
{αcs} can then be used to predict the effects of fiscal policy. To see this, suppose the
zero lower bound is binding until T so that it = 0 for t < T; suppose that after
T monetary policy delivers an equilibrium with zero inflation, so that pit = 0 for
t ≥ T. As is well known, the resulting equilibrium without government spending
(gt = 0 for all t) features a negative consumption gap and deflation: c˜t, p˜it < 0 for
t < T (e.g. see Werning, 2012).
Now, consider a stimulus plan that attempts to improve this outcome by setting
gt > 0 for t < T and gt = 0. Then
´ ∞
0 α
c
sgt+sds =
´ T
0 α
c
sgt+sds is precisely the
effect of the fiscal expansion on consumption ct, relative to the outcome without the
stimulus plan c˜t.
More generally, suppose after the trap we spending may be nonzero and that mon-
etary may or may not be described as securing zero inflation. Even in this case,
we may still use fiscal multipliers to measure the impact of fiscal policy during the
liquidity trap: one can write ct = cT +
´ T−t
0 α
c
sgt+sds for t < T, where the cT encap-
sulates the combined effects of fiscal and monetary policy after the trap t ≥ T.
2. More conceptually, our fiscal multipliers provide a natural decomposition of the
effects of the fiscal policy, over what is attainable by monetary policy alone.
Equations (3a)–(3b) characterize the entire set of equilibria for g 6= 0 by providing
a one-to-one mapping between equilibria with g = 0. Both c˜t and p˜it are equilib-
ria with g = 0 and are affected by monetary policy, as summarized, among other
things, by the interest rate path {it}.
We can represent these facts as a relationship between the set of equilibria with and
without government spending,
Eg = E0 + α · g,
where E0 represents the set of equilibria when gt = 0 for all t, while Eg is the set of
equilibria for a given path for spending g = {gt}. Here α = {αcs, αpis } collects the
9
α
· g
α
· g
E0
Eg
Figure 1: A schematic depiction of the set of equilibria without government spending and
the set of equilibria for a given spending path {gt}.
fiscal multipliers and the cross product α · g represents the integrals ´ ∞0 αisgt+sds for
i = c,pi. The set Eg is a displaced version of E0 in the direction α · g. Each equilib-
rium point in E0 is shifted in parallel by α · g to another equilibrium point in Eg and
it shares the same nominal interest rate path {it}. This last fact is unimportant for
this second conceptual motivation, since the focus is on comparing the two sets, not
equilibrium points. Instead, the important issue is that α · g measures the influence
of government spending on the set of equilibria. This provides a conceptual moti-
vation for studying the multipliers α, since they summarize this influence. In other
words, without spending one can view monetary policy as selecting from the set E0,
while with government spending monetary policy can choose from Eg. The effects
of fiscal policy on the new options is then precisely determined by the shift α · g.
Figure 1 represents this idea pictorially.3
Our first result delivers a closed-form solution for fiscal multipliers. Using this closed
form one can characterize the multiplier quite tightly.
3The figure is purposefully abstract and meant to convey the notion of a parallel shift only, so we have
not labeled either axis and the shape of the sets is purely for illustrative purposes.
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Figure 2: Liquidity trap and currency union consumption multipliers αcs and α
c,t,CM
s−t as a
function of s. Each curve for αc,t,CMs−t is plotted for different values of t ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1, 3}.
The black dashed line shows the lower envelope. Parameters are σ = 1, η = γ = 1, e = 6,
φ = 3, λ = 0.14 and α = 0.4.
Proposition 1 (Closed Economy Multiplier). The fiscal multipliers are given by
αcs = σˆ
−1κ(1− ξ)e−ν¯s
(
e(ν¯−ν)s − 1
ν¯− ν
)
.
The instantaneous consumption fiscal multiplier is zero αc0 = 0, but is positive, increasing and
convex for large s so that lims→∞ αcs = ∞.
The left panel of figure 2 displays these consumption multipliers αcs as a function of s
for a standard calibration. The proposition states that current spending has no effect on
consumption: αc0 = 0. By implication, changes in spending that are very temporary are
expected to have negligible effects on consumption and have an output multiplier that is
near unity. As stated earlier, the effects of government spending on consumption work
through inflation. Current spending does affect the current inflation rate and this affects
the growth rate of consumption. However, since this higher inflation is so short-lived the
lower growth rate for consumption has no significant stretch of time to impact the level
of consumption.
In contrast, spending that takes place in the far future can have a very large impact.
The further out into the future, the larger the impact, since αcs is increasing in s. Indeed,
in the limit the effect becomes unbounded, since lims→∞ αcs = ∞. The logic behind these
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results is that spending at s > 0 increases inflation over the entire interval of time [0, s].
This then lowers the real interest over this same time interval and lowers the growth rate
of consumption. Since the long-run consumption level is fixed, the lower growth rate
raises the level of consumption. This rise in consumption in turn leads to higher inflation,
creating a feedback cycle. The larger the interval [0, s] over which these effect have time
to act, the larger is the effect on consumption.
The fact that fiscal multipliers are unbounded as s → ∞ stands in strong contrast to
the zero multiplier at s = 0. It also has important implications. For example, a posi-
tive path for spending {gt} that is very backloaded can create a very large response for
consumption. This is the case if the shock to spending is very persistent.
Example 1 (AR(1) spending). Suppose gt = ge−ρgt, then if ρg > −ν > 0 the response of
consumption ct is finite and given by
ˆ
αcsge
−ρg(t+s)ds = σˆ
−1κ(1− ξ)
(ρg + ν)(ρg + ν¯)
ge−ρgt.
The condition ρg > −ν > 0 requires spending to revert to zero fast enough to prevent the
integral from being infinite.
Some paths for spending imply an infinite value for
´ ∞
0 α
c
sgsds. For instance, this is the
case in the example above when ρg < −ν. How should one interpret such cases? Tech-
nically, this may invalidate our approximation. However, we think the correct economic
conclusion to draw is that spending will have an explosive positive effect on consump-
tion. One way to see this is to truncate the path of spending {gt}, by setting gt = 0 for all
t ≥ T for some large T. This ensures that ´ T0 αcsgsds is finite but the response is guaranteed
to be very large if the cutoff is large.
Next, we ask how fiscal multipliers are affected by the degree of price stickiness. De-
partures from the neoclassical benchmark, where the consumption multiplier is negative,
require some stickiness in prices. Perhaps surprisingly, the resulting Keynesian effects
turn out to be decreasing in the degree of price stickiness.
Proposition 2 (Price Stickiness). The fiscal multipliers {αcs}
1. are zero when prices are rigid κ = 0;
2. are increasing in price flexibility κ;
3. converge to infinity, αcs → ∞, in the limit as prices become fully flexible so that κ → ∞.
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The logic for these results relies on the fact that spending acts on consumption through
inflation. At one extreme, if prices were perfectly rigid then inflation would be fixed at
zero and spending has no effect on consumption. As prices become more flexible spend-
ing has a greater impact on inflation and, hence, on consumption. Indeed, in the limit
as prices become perfectly flexible, inflation becomes so responsive that the effects on
consumption explode.
Recall that our fiscal multipliers are calculated under the assumption that the path for
interest rates remains unchanged when spending rises. These results seem less counterin-
tuitive when one realizes that such a monetary policy, insisting on keeping interest rates
unchanged, may be deemed to be looser when prices are more flexible and inflation reacts
more. Of course, this is precisely the relevant calculation when the economy finds itself
in a liquidity trap, so that interest rates are up against the zero lower bound.
3.2 Summary Fiscal Multipliers
Up to now we have discussed properties of fiscal multipliers {αcs}. Usually, fiscal mul-
tipliers are portrayed as a single number that summarizes the impact of some change in
spending on output or consumption, perhaps conditional on the state of the economy or
monetary policy. This requires collapsing the entire sequence of fiscal multipliers {αcs}
into a single number α¯, which we shall call a summary fiscal multiplier.
At time t we shock spending from zero to {gt+s} and wish to summarize the impact
on current consumption ct by the ratio
α¯ =
´ ∞
0 α
c
sgsds´ ∞
0 α
g
s gsds
.
The numerator is simply the impact on consumption, while the denominator introduces
a weighting sequence {αgs } to summarize the path of spending into a single number.
One natural candidate is to have the denominator represent a present value by setting
α
g
s = e−
´ s
0 rzdz, αgS = e
− ´ s0 (it−pit)dz or αgs = e−ρs. It is common in the literature to compute
multipliers using current spending only as follows:
α¯ =
´ ∞
0 α
c
sgsds
g0
.
One can interpret this as an extreme (Dirac) weighting function αg that puts full mass at
s = 0 and no weight on any s > 0.
We could also take an average for the impact on consumption
´ ∞
0 α
c
sgt+sds at each
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moment in time t in the numerator,
´
λct
´ ∞
0 α
c
sgt+sdsdt´ ∞
0 α
g
s gsds
where {λct} are weights. The summary multipliers above implicitly put full weight on
the consumption response at t = 0, but we can also consider nonzero weights on future
consumption responses. For example, we could set {λct} so as to compute the response in
the present value of consumption.
As this discussion makes clear there are many possibilities for summary multipliers
and no universal criteria to select them. Instead, one can adapt the summary multiplier
to the application and relevant policy at hand. The characterizations provided in the
previous section have implications for any of these measures. Namely,
1. the instantaneous multiplier is zero: if spending {gt} converges to being concen-
trated at t = 0 then α¯ = 0;
2. the multiplier is increasing in flexibility, it is zero with rigid prices κ = 0 and goes
to infinity in the limit of flexible prices κ → ∞, provided gt is positive for all t.
Example 2. Suppose we have an autoregressive spending path gt = ge−ρgt for ρg > 0.
The summary multiplier is independent of g0 and given by
α¯ =
´ ∞
0 α
c
sgsds´ ∞
0 α
g
s gsds
=
1
ρg
´ ∞
0 α
c
se
−ρgsds
1
ρg
´ ∞
0 α
g
s e−ρgsds
.
Both the numerator and denominator are weighted averages of {αcs} and {αgs }. Higher
values of ρg then shift weight towards the future. Recall that αc is increasing. If αg is de-
creasing, as is most natural, then the numerator increases and the denominator decreases
with ρg. More persistence leads to higher summary multipliers.
The next result is related to this example and shows that delays in spending increase the
summary multiplier.
Proposition 3. Consider two paths {gat } and {gbt } with
´ ∞
0 α
g
s gas ds =
´ ∞
0 α
g
s gbs ds. Suppose
{gbt }t≥0 single crosses {gat }t≥0 from below (i.e. there exists t′ > 0 such that gat > gbt for t < t′
and gat < g
b
t for t > t
′). Then α¯b > α¯a.
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3.3 Endogenous Spending and Filling the Gap
The policies for the spending under consideration may be best thought of as endogenous,
because they depend on the state of the economy which itself depends on parameters. As
we vary parameters this affects both structural fiscal multipliers {αct} and the path {gt}.
Both impact summary fiscal multipliers.
Example 3. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) compute summary multipliers in
a liquidity trap as a function of parameters, using initial spending in the denominator.
Their results suggest that parameter values that make the recession worse also lead to
larger multipliers. In some cases this follow because the parameters affect the fiscal mul-
tipliers {αcs} directly. For example, this is true for the degree of price flexibility κ. Higher
price flexibility makes the recession worse (Werning, 2012) and also leads to higher fiscal
multipliers as shown in Proposition 2. However, in other cases their conclusion rely on
the indirect effects that these parameters have on the policy experiment {gt} and, thus,
on summary multipliers.
Their setup features Poisson uncertainty, but a deterministic version of their calcula-
tions is as follows.4 Suppose the economy is in a liquidity trap with zero interest rates for
t ≤ T and will returns to the natural allocation ct = gt = 0 for t ≥ T. Consider fiscal
policy interventions that increase spending during the trap, gt = g for t ≤ T and gt = 0
for t > T. Higher T leads to a deeper recession (see Werning, 2012), but has no effect
on the fiscal multipliers {αct}. However, T does have an indirect effect on the summary
multiplier
α¯ =
´ T
0 α
c
s g¯ds
g¯
=
ˆ T
0
αcsds,
which is increasing and convex in T.
If T is larger the summary multiplier is larger, but not because spending is any more
effective. For instance, it would be wrong conclude that a stimulus plan that increased
spending for a fixed amount of time, such as a year or two, would be more powerful when
T is large. Rather, when T is increased then spending during the trap has a bigger effect
because we are doing more of it by extending the time interval over which it takes place.
Indeed, since this extension backloads spending we know from Proposition 1 that it will
be particularly effective. Of course, this extension may be warranted precisely because
spending affects the allocation at all prior dates.
Example 4. Another perspective is provided when gt is set as a function of current con-
4Their parameter p, which represents the probability of remaining in the trap, has an effect similar to T
in our deterministic setting.
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sumption:
gt = −Ψct,
then the Phillips curve becomes
p˙it = ρpit − κ(1− (1− ξ)Ψ)ct,
and the equilibrium is just as if we had a lower κ given by κˆ = κ(1− (1− ξ)Ψ).
Suppose further that Ψ = (1− ξ)−1, so that spending fills the gap and ct + (1− ξ)gt =
0. Inflation is then zero and the outcome for consumption is as if prices were completely
rigid κˆ = 0. With this particular policy in place, consider different values for κ. The
spending path gt does not depend on κ. However, the equilibrium outcome without
spending (i.e. gt = 0) is decreasing in κ (see Werning, 2012). Thus, fiscal policy affects
consumption more the more flexible prices are. This result is consistent with our more
general results in Proposition 2 regarding the effects of price flexibility.
4 An Open Economy Model of a Currency Union
We now turn to open economy models similar to Farhi and Werning (2012a,b) which in
turn build on Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008).
The model focuses on a continuum of regions or countries that share a common cur-
rency. One interpretation is that these regions are states or provinces within a country.
Our analysis is then directly relevant to the literature estimating “local” multipliers, ex-
ploiting cross-sectional variation in spending behavior across states in the United States
to estimate the effects on income and employment. Another interpretation is to member
countries within a currency union, such as the European Monetary Union (EMU). Our
analysis then sheds light on the debates over fiscal policy, stimulus versus austerity, for
periphery countries.
For concreteness, from now on we will refer to these economic units (regions or coun-
tries) simply as countries. We focus on the effects around a symmetric steady state after a
fiscal policy is realized in every country. A crucial ingredient is how private agents share
risk internationally. We consider the two polar case: (i) incomplete markets, where agents
can only trade a risk-free bond; and (ii) complete markets with perfect risk sharing. These
two market structures have different implications for fiscal multipliers.
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4.1 Households
There is a continuum measure one of countries i ∈ [0, 1]. We focus attention on a single
country, which we call “home” and can be thought of as a particular value H ∈ [0, 1]. We
will focus on a one time shock, so that all uncertainty is realized at t = 0. Thus, we can
describe the economy after the realization of the shock as a deterministic function of time.
In every country, there is a representative household with preferences represented by
the utility function ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
G1−σt
1− σ −
N1+φt
1+ φ
]
dt,
where Nt is labor, and Ct is a consumption index defined by
Ct =
[
(1− α) 1η C
η−1
η
H,t + α
1
η C
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
,
where CH,t is an index of consumption of domestic goods given by
CH,t =
(ˆ 1
0
CH,t(j)
e−1
e dj
) e
e−1
,
where j ∈ [0, 1] denotes an individual good variety. Similarly, CF,t is a consumption index
of imported goods given by
CF,t =
(ˆ 1
0
C
γ−1
γ
i,t di
) γ
γ−1
,
where Ci,t is, in turn, an index of the consumption of varieties of goods imported from
country i, given by
Ci,t =
(ˆ 1
0
Ci,t(j)
e−1
e dj
) e
e−1
.
Thus, e is the elasticity between varieties produced within a given country, η the elasticity
between domestic and foreign goods, and γ the elasticity between goods produced in
different foreign countries. An important special case obtains when σ = η = γ = 1. We
call this the Cole-Obstfeld case, in reference to Cole and Obstfeld (1991).
The parameter α indexes the degree of home bias, and can be interpreted as a measure
of openness. Consider both extremes: as α → 0 the share of foreign goods vanishes; as
α → 1 the share of home goods vanishes. Since the country is infinitesimal, the latter
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captures a very open economy without home bias; the former a closed economy barely
trading with the outside world.
Households seek to maximize their utility subject to the budget constraints
D˙t = itDt −
ˆ 1
0
PH,t(j)CH,t(j)dj−
ˆ 1
0
ˆ 1
0
Pi,t(j)Ci,t(j)djdi +WtNt +Πt + Tt
for t ≥ 0. In this equation, PH,t(j) is the price of domestic variety j, Pi,t is the price of
variety j imported from country i, Wt is the nominal wage, Πt represents nominal profits
and Tt is a nominal lump-sum transfer. All these variables are expressed in the common
currency. The bond holdings of home agents is denoted by Dt and the common nominal
interest rate within the union is denoted by it.
We sometimes allow for transfers across countries that are contingent on shocks. These
transfers may be due to private arrangements in complete financial markets. or due to
government arrangements. These transfers can accrue to the government or directly to
the agents. This is irrelevant since lump-sum taxes are available. For example, we some-
times consider the assumption of complete markets where agents in different countries
can perfectly share risks in a complete set of financial markets. Agents form international
portfolios, the returns of which result in international transfers that are contingent on the
realization of the shock. A different example is in Section 6 where we consider govern-
ment spending in the home country paid for by a transfer from the rest of the world. In
this case, we have in mind a direct transfer to the government of the home country, or
simply spending paid for and made by the rest of the world.
4.2 Government
Government consumption Gt is an aggregate of different varieties. Importantly, we as-
sume that government spending is concentrated exclusively on domestic varieties
Gt =
(ˆ 1
0
Gt(j)
e−1
e dj
) e
e−1
.
For any level of expenditure
´ 1
0 PH,t(j)Gt(j)dj, the government splits its expenditure across
varieties to maximize government consumption Gt. Spending is financed by lump-sum
taxes. The timing of these taxes is irrelevant since Ricardian equivalence holds in our
basic model. We only examine a potentially non-Ricardian setting in Section 7 where we
introduce hand-to-mouth consumers into the model.
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4.3 Firms
Technology. A typical firm in the home economy produces a differentiated good using
a linear technology
Yt(j) = AH,tNt(j),
where AH,t is productivity in the home country. We denote productivity in country i by
Ai,t.
We allow for a constant employment tax 1+ τL, so that real marginal cost deflated by
Home PPI is 1+τ
L
AH,t
Wt
PH,t
. We take this employment tax to be constant and set to offset the
monopoly distortion so that τL = −1ε , as is standard in the literature. However, none of
our results hinge on this particular value.
Price-setting assumptions. We assume that the Law of One Price holds so that at all
times, the price of a given variety in different countries is identical once expressed in the
same currency.
We adopt the Calvo price setting framework, where in every period, a randomly flow
ρδ of firms can reset their prices. Those firms that get to reset their price choose a reset
price Prt to solve
max
Prt
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρδs−
´ s
0 it+zdz
(
Prt Yt+s|t − (1+ τL)Wt
Yt+s|t
AH,t
)
,
where Yt+k|t =
(
Prt
PH,t+k
)−e
Yt+k, taking the sequences for Wt, Yt and PH,t as given.
4.4 Terms of Trade and Real Exchange Rate
It is useful to define the following price indices: the home Consumer Price Index (CPI) is
Pt = [(1− α)P1−ηH,t + αP∗1−ηt ]
1
1−η ,
the home Producer Price Index (PPI)
PH,t = [
ˆ 1
0
PH,t(j)1−edj]
1
1−e ,
and P∗t is the price index for imported goods. The terms of trade are defined by
St =
P∗t
PH,t
.
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Similarly let the real exchange rate be
Qt = P
∗
t
Pt
.
4.5 Equilibrium Conditions
We now summarize the equilibrium conditions. For simplicity of exposition, we focus on
the case where all foreign countries are identical. Because agents face the same sequence
of interest rates optimal consumption satisfies
Ct = ΘC∗tQ
1
σ
t ,
where Θ is a relative Pareto weight which might depend on the realization of the shocks,
the goods market clearing condition
Yt = [(1− α)Ct + Gt]
(Qt
St
)−η
+ αSγt C
∗
t .
We also have the labor market clearing condition
Nt =
Yt
AH,t
∆t,
where ∆t is an index of price dispersion ∆t =
´ 1
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−e
and the Euler equation
σ
C˙t
Ct
= it − pit − ρ,
where pit = P˙t/Pt is CPI inflation. Finally, we must include the country-wide budget
constraint
˙NFAt = (PH,tYt − PtCt) + itNFAt,
where NFAt is the country’s net foreign assets at t, which for convenience, we measure in
home numeraire. We impose a standard no-Ponzi condition, e−
´ t
0 isdsNFAt → 0 as t→ ∞.
Absent transfers or insurance across countries we set NFA0 to be constant for all shock
realizations, and normalize its value to zero. Instead, when markets are complete we
require that Θ does not vary with the shock realization. We then solve for the initial value
of NFA0 that is needed, for each shock realization. This value can be interpreted as an
insurance transfer from the rest of the world.
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Finally with Calvo price setting we have the equations summarizing the first-order
condition for optimal price setting. We omit these conditions since we will only analyze
a log-linearized version of the model.
5 National and Local FiscalMultipliers in CurrencyUnions
To compute local multipliers we study the log-linearized equilibrium conditions around a
symmetric steady state with zero inflation. We denote the deviations of output and public
consumption on home goods relative to steady state output by
ct = (1− G)(log(Yt − Gt)− log(Y− G)) ≈ Yt − Gt − (Y− G)Y
yt = log(Yt)− log(Y) ≈ Yt −YY gt = G(log Gt − log G) ≈
Gt − G
Y
where G = GY denotes the steady state share of government spending in output. Then we
have, up to a first order approximation,
yt = ct + gt,
Note that ct does not represent private domestic total consumption (of home and foreign
goods); instead it is private consumption (domestic and foreign) of domestic goods. In a
closed economy the two coincide, but in an open economy, for our purposes, the latter is
more relevant and convenient.
The log linearized system can then be written as a set of differential equations
p˙iH,t = ρpiH,t − κ(ct + (1− ξ)gt)− λσˆα(ω− 1)c∗t − (1− G)λσˆαωθ, (4)
c˙t = σˆ−1(i∗t − piH,t − ρ)− α(ω− 1)c˙∗t , (5)
with an initial condition and the definition of the variable θ,
c0 = (1− G)(1− α)θ + c∗0 , (6)
θ =
ρ
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
nfa0 +Ωρ
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρt (ct − c∗t ) dt, (7)
and either
nfa0 = 0 (8)
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if markets are incomplete or
θ = 0 (9)
if markets are complete, where nfa0 =
NFA0
Y is the normalized deviation of the initial net
foreign asset position from (nfa0 = 0 at the symmetric steady state) and θ = logΘ is the
wedge in the log-linearized Backus-Smith equation (θ = 0 at the symmetric steady state).
In these equations, we have used the following definitions: λ = ρδ(ρ+ ρδ), κ = λ(σˆ+ φ),
ξ = σˆσˆ+φ and
ω = σγ+ (1− α)(ση − 1),
σˆ =
σ
1− α+ αω
1
1− G ,
Γ = 1+ (1− G)
(ω
σ
− 1
)
σˆ(1− α),
Ω =
(
ω
σ − 1
)
σˆ
Γ
.
Equation (4) is the New-Keynesian Philips Curve. Equation (5) is the Euler equation.
Equation (6) is derived from the requirement that the terms of trade are predetermined
at t = 0 because prices are sticky and the exchange rate is fixed. Finally equation (7)
together with either (8) or (9) depending on whether markets are incomplete or complete,
represents the country budget constraint. In the Cole-Obstfeld case σ = η = γ = 1,
we have Ω = 0 so that the complete and incomplete markets solutions coincide. Away
from the Cole-Obstfeld case, the complete and incomplete markets solutions differ. The
incomplete markets solution imposes that the country budget constraint (7) with nfa0 = 0,
while the complete markets solution solves for the endogenous value of nfa0 that ensures
that the country budget constraint (7) holds with θ = 0. This can be interpreted as an
insurance payment from the rest of the world.
These equations form a linear differential system with forcing variables {gt, g∗t , i∗t }. It
will prove useful to define the following two numbers ν and ν¯ (the eigenvalues of the
system):
ν =
ρ−√ρ2 + 4κσˆ−1
2
ν¯ =
ρ+
√
ρ2 + 4κσˆ−1
2
.
5.1 Home Government Spending
We first consider the experiment where the only shock is home government spending, so
that i∗t = ρ, g∗t = y∗t = c∗t = 0. Note that if gt = 0 throughout then θ = 0 and yt = ct = 0.
We shall compute the deviations from this steady state when gt 6= 0.
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The assumptions one makes about financial markets can affect the results. We con-
sider, in turn, both the cases of complete markets and incomplete markets.
Complete Markets. We start by studying the case where markets are complete. This
assumption is representative of most of the literature. The assumption is often adopted
as a benchmark due to its tractability. The key implication is that consumption is insured
against spending shocks. In equilibrium, private agents make arrangements with the
rest of the world to receive transfers when spending shoots up and, conversely, to make
transfers when spending shoots down. As a result, government sending shocks to not
affect consumption on impact. Formally, we have θ = 0, so the system becomes
p˙iH,t = ρpiH,t − κ(ct + (1− ξ)gt),
c˙t = −σˆ−1piH,t,
with initial condition
c0 = 0.
Because the system is linear, we can write
ct =
ˆ ∞
−t
αc,t,CMs gt+sds,
piH,t =
ˆ ∞
−t
αpi,t,CMs gt+sds,
where the superscript CM stands for complete markets. Note two important differences
with the closed economy case. First, there are both forward- and backward-looking effects
from government spending; the lower bound in these integrals is now given by−t instead
of 0. At every point in time consumption is pinned down by the terms of trade which
depend on past inflation. Second, the multipliers depend on calendar time t.
Proposition 4 (Complete Markets). Suppose that markets are complete, then the fiscal multi-
pliers are given by
αc,t,CMs =
−σˆ−1κ(1− ξ)e−νs 1−e
(ν−ν¯)(s+t)
ν¯−ν s < 0
−σˆ−1κ(1− ξ)e−ν¯s 1−e−(ν¯−ν)tν¯−ν s ≥ 0.
It follows that
1. for t = 0 we have αc,t,CMs = 0 for all s,
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2. for t > 0 we have αc,t,CMs < 0 for all s,
3. for t→ ∞ we have αc,t,CMs−t → 0 for all s,
4. spending at zero and infinity have no impact: αc,t,CM−t = lims→∞ α
c,t,CM
s = 0.
The right panel of figure 2 displays consumption multipliers for a standard calibration.
Consumption multipliers are very different in an open economy with a fixed exchange
rate. For starters, part (1) says that the initial response of consumption is always zero,
simply restating the initial condition above that c0 = 0. This follows from the fact that the
terms of trade are predetermined and complete markets insure consumption.
Part (2) proves that the consumption response at any other date is actually negative.
Note that the Euler equation and the initial condition together imply that
ct = −σˆ−1 log PH,tPH .
Government spending increases demand, leading to inflation, a rise in PH,t. In other
words, it leads to an appreciation in the terms of trade and this loss in competitiveness
depresses private demand, from both domestic and foreign consumers. Although we
have derived this result in a specific setting, we expect it to be robust. The key ingredients
are that consumption depends negatively on the terms of trade and that government
spending creates inflation.
It may seem surprising that the output multiplier is necessarily less than one when-
ever the exchange rate is fixed, because this contrasts sharply with our conclusions in a
closed economy with a fixed interest rate. They key here is that a fixed exchange rate
implies a fixed interest rate, but the reverse is not true. We expand on this idea in the next
subsection.
Part (3) says that the impact of government spending at any date on private consump-
tion vanishes in the long run. This exact long run neutrality relies on the assumption of
complete markets; otherwise, there are potential long-run neoclassical wealth effects from
accumulation of foreign assets.
Part (4) says that spending near zero and spending in the very far future have neg-
ligible impacts on consumption at any date. Spending near zero affects inflation for a
trivial amount of time and thus have has insignificant effects on the level of home prices.
Similarly, spending in the far future has vanishing effects on inflation at any date.
Example 5 (Complete Markets, AR(1)). Suppose that gt = ge−ρgt and that markets are
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complete. Then
ct = −geνt 1− e
−(ν+ρg)t
ν+ ρg
σˆ−1κ(1− ξ)
ν¯+ ρg
.
For g > 0, this example shows that ct is always negative. In other words, in the open
economy model with complete markets, output always expands less than the increase in
government spending. The intuition is simple. Because the terms of trade are predeter-
mined, private spending on home goods is also predetermined so that c0 = 0. Govern-
ment spending initially leads to inflation because the total (public and private) demand
for home goods is increased in the short run. With fixed nominal interest rates, inflation
depresses real interest rates, leading to a decreasing path of private consumption of do-
mestic goods, so that ct becomes negative. The inflationary pressures are greatest at t = 0
and they then recede over time as public and private demand decrease. Indeed at some
point in time, inflation becomes negative and in the long run, the terms of trade return to
their steady state value. At that point, private consumption of domestic goods cˆt reaches
its minimum and starts increasing, returning to 0 in the long run. The crucial role of in-
flation in generating ct < 0 is most powerfully illustrated in the rigid price case. When
prices are entirely rigid, we have κ = 0 so that ct = 0 throughout.5
An interesting observation is that the openness parameter α enters Proposition 4 or
Example 5 only through its effect on σˆ.6 As a result, in the Cole-Obstfeld case σ = η = γ =
1 and the private consumption multipliers αc,ts are completely independent of openness α.
Away from the Cole-Obstfeld case, αc,ts depends on α, but its dependence can be positive
or negative depending on the parameters.7
Next, we ask how fiscal multipliers are affected by the degree of price stickiness.
Proposition 5 (Price Stickiness). The fiscal multipliers {αc,t,CMs } depend on price flexibility as
follows:
1. when prices are rigid so that κ = 0, we have αc,t,CMs = 0 for all s and t;
2. when prices become perfectly flexible κ → ∞, then for all t, the function s → αc,t,CMs
converges in distributions to −(1− ξ) times a Dirac distribution concentrated at s = 0,
implying that
´ ∞
−t α
c,t,CM
s gt+sds = −(1− ξ)gt for all (continuous and bounded) paths of
government spending {gt}.
5Note that the above calculation is valid even if ρg < 0, as long as ν¯+ ρg > 0. If this condition is violated,
then ct is −∞ for g > 0 and +∞ for g < 0.
6Recall that σˆ = σ1+α[(σγ−1)+(ση−1)−α(ση−1)]
1
1−G .
7For example, when ση > 1 and σγ > 1, αc,ts is increasing in α for α ∈ [0, min{ (σγ−1)+(ση−1)2(ση−1) , 1}] and
decreasing in α for α ∈ [min{ (σγ−1)+(ση−1)2(ση−1) , 1}, 1].
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Unlike in the liquidity trap, fiscal multipliers do not explode when prices become more
flexible. In a liquidity trap, government spending sets into motion a feedback loop be-
tween consumption and inflation: government spending increases inflation, which lower
real interest rates, increases private consumption, further increasing inflation etc. ad in-
finitum. This feedback loop is non-existent in a currency union: government spending
increases inflation, appreciates the terms of trade, reduces private consumption, reducing
the inflationary pressure. Instead, the allocation converges to the flexible price alloca-
tion ct = −(1− ξ)gt when prices become very flexible. At the flexible price allocation,
private consumption is entirely determined by contemporaneous government spending.
Hence the function αc,t,CMs of s converges in distributions to −(1− ξ) times a Dirac func-
tion at s = 0. This implies that fact that for s = 0, limκ→∞ αc,t,CMs = −∞ and for s 6= 0,
limκ→∞ αc,t,CMs = 0.
One can reinterpret the neoclassical outcome with flexible prices as applying to the
case with rigid prices and a flexible exchange rate that is adjusted to replicate the flexible
price allocation. The output multiplier is then less than one. The first result says that
with rigid prices but fixed exchange rates, output multipliers are equal to one. In this
sense, the comparison between fixed with flexible exchange rates confirms the conven-
tional view from the Mundell-Flemming model that fiscal policy is more effective with
fixed exchange rates (see e.g. Dornbusch, 1980). This is consistent with the simulation
findings in Corsetti, Kuester and Muller (2011).
Incomplete Markets. We now turn our attention to the case where markets are in-
complete. Although the complete market assumption is often adopted for tractability,
we believe incomplete markets may be a better approximation to reality in most cases of
interest.
A shock to spending may create income effects that affect consumption and labor re-
sponses. The complete markets solution secures transfers from the rest of the world that
effectively cancel these income effects. As a result, the incomplete markets solution is in
general different from the complete market case. One exception is the Cole-Obstfeld case,
where σ = η = γ = 1.
With incomplete markets, the system becomes
p˙iH,t = ρpiH,t − κ(ct + (1− ξ)gt)− (1− G)λσˆαωθ,
c˙t = −σˆ−1piH,t,
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with initial condition
c0 = (1− G)(1− α)θ,
θ = Ωρ
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtctdt.
We denote the consumption multipliers with a superscript IM, which stands for incom-
plete markets. We denote by tˆ the time such that
eνtˆ
1− eνtˆ = ω
σˆ
σˆ+ φ
α
1− α .
We also define
Ω¯ =
Ω(1− ξ)
1−Ω(1− G)(1− α)
[
ρ
ν¯ +
ν
ν¯ω
σˆ
σˆ+φ
α
1−α
] .
Note that Ω¯ = 0 in the Cole-Obstfeld case.
Proposition 6 (Incomplete Markets). Suppose that markets are incomplete, then
αc,t,IMs = α
c,t,CM
s + δ
c,t,IM
s ,
where αc,t,CMs is the complete markets consumption multiplier characterized in Proposition 4 and
δc,t,IMs = (1− G)αρΩ¯
[
eνt
1− α
α
− (1− eνt)ω σˆ
σˆ+ φ
]
e−ρ(s+t)(1− eν(s+t)).
The difference δc,t,IMs is 0 in the Cole-Obstfeld case σ = η = γ = 1. Away from the Cole-
Obstfled case, the sign of δc,t,IMs is the same as the sign of (ωσ − 1)(t− tˆ); moreover, δc,t,IM−t = 0
and lims→∞ δc,t,IMs = 0.
The difference between the complete and incomplete market solution vanishes in the
Cole-Obstfeld case. Although, away from the this case δc,t,IMs is generally nonzero, it
necessarily changes signs (both as a function of s for a given t, and as a function of t, for
a given s). In this sense, incomplete markets cannot robustly overturn the conclusion of
Proposition 4 and guarantee positive multipliers for consumption.
With complete markets
θ = 0,
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while with incomplete markets
θ = −ρΩ¯
ˆ ∞
0
gse−ρs(1− eνs)ds.
This means that with complete markets, home receives an endogenous transfer nfa0 from
the rest of the world following a government spending shock. In the Cole-Obstfeld case,
this transfer is zero, but away from this case, this transfer is nonzero. The difference
between these two solutions can then be obtained as the effect of this endogenous transfer,
using the analysis in Section 6.2.
Example 6 (Incomplete Markets, AR(1)). Suppose that gt = ge−ρgt. Then
ct = (1− G)αθ
[
eνt
1− α
α
− (1− eνt)ω σˆ
σˆ+ φ
]
− geνt 1− e
−(ν+ρg)t
ν+ ρg
σˆ−1κ(1− ξ)
ν¯+ ρg
,
where
θ = −gρΩ¯ −ν
(ρ+ ρg)(ν¯+ ρg)
.
The second term of the right hand side of the expression for ct is identical to the complete
markets solution identified in Example 5. When g > 0, it is always negative. The first
term on the right hand side of this expression arises only because markets are incomplete.
Indeed in vanishes in the Cole-Obstfeld case where the complete and incomplete markets
solution coincide. It is small compared to the first term in the neighborhood of the Cole-
Obstfeld case. It necessarily changes sign over time. For ωσ close to 1, θ is of the same sign
as 1− ωσ . Hence the first term is of the same sign as 1− ωσ for small t and of the opposite
sign for large t.
5.2 Understanding Closed versus Open Economy Multipliers
Figure 2 provides a sharp illustration of the difference between a liquidity trap and a
currency union. In a liquidity trap, consumption multipliers are positive, increase with
the date of spending, and becomes arbitrarily large for long-dated spending. By contrast,
in a currency union, consumption multipliers are negative, V-shaped and bounded as a
function of the date of spending, and asymptote to zero for long-dated spending.
Before continuing it is useful to pause to develop a deeper understanding of the key
difference between the closed and open economy results. The two models are somewhat
different—the open economy features trade in goods and the closed economy does not—
yet they are quite comparable. Indeed, we will highlight that the crucial difference lies
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in monetary policy, not model primitives. Although a fixed exchange rate implies a fixed
nominal interest rate, the converse is not true.
To make the closed economy and open economies more comparable we consider the
limit of the latter as α → 0. This limit represents a closed economy in the sense that pref-
erences display an extreme home bias and trade is zero. To simplify, we focus on the case
of complete markets so that θ = 0. Even in this limit case, the closed and open economy
multipliers differ. This might seems surprising since, after all, both experiments consider
the effects of government spending for a fixed nominal interest rate. To understand the
difference, we allow for an initial devaluation.
Consider then the open economy model in the closed-economy limit α → 0 and let
e0 denote the new value for the exchange rate after the shock in log deviations relative
to its steady-state value (so that e0 = 0 represents no devaluation). The only difference
introduced in the system by such one-time devaluation is a change the initial condition
to8
c0 = σˆ−1e0.
The exchange rate devaluation e0 depreciates the initial terms of trade one for one and
increases the demand for home goods through an expenditure switching effect. Of course,
this stimulative effect is present in the short run, but vanishes in the long run once prices
have adjusted.
Now if in the closed economy limit of the open economy model, we set the devaluation
e0 so that σˆ−1e0 exactly equals the initial consumption response
´ ∞
0 α
c
sgt+sds of the closed
economy model, i.e.
e0 =
ˆ ∞
0
κ(1− ξ)e−ν¯s
(
e(ν¯−ν)s − 1
ν¯− ν
)
gsds, (10)
then we find exactly the same response for consumption and inflation as in the closed
economy model. This means that if we combined the government spending shock with
8The full system allowing for a flexible exchange rate and an independent monetary policy it is (with
θ = 0 and c∗t = 0)
p˙iH,t = ρpiH,t − κ(ct + (1− ξ)gt),
c˙t = σˆ−1(it − piH,t − ρ),
e˙t = it − i∗t ,
with initial condition
c0 = σˆ−1e0.
If we set it = i∗t then e˙t = 0 so that et = e0, which amounts to a one-time devaluation.
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an initial devaluation given by (10), then the multipliers of the closed economy limit of
the open economy model would coincide with those of the closed economy model.9
This analysis shows that the policy analysis conducted for our closed economy model
implicitly combines a shock to government spending with a devaluation.10 In contrast,
our open economy analysis assumes fixed exchange rates, ruling out such devaluations.
The positive response of consumption in the closed economy model relies entirely on this
one-time devaluation. Thus, the key difference between the two models is in monetary
policy, not whether the economy is modeled as open or closed. Indeed, we have taken the
closed-economy limit α→ 0, but the results hold more generally: the degree of openness
α matters only indirectly through its impact on σˆ, ν and ν¯ and in the Cole-Obstfeld case,
α actually does not even affect these parameters.
5.3 Domestic Government Spending on Foreign Goods
We now analyze the impact of domestic government spending on foreign goods gF,t. We
treat both the cases of complete and incomplete markets.
When markets are complete, spending on foreign goods has absolutely no effect, ct =
0 and piH,t = 0. This follows because this shock to spending is then effectively fully
paid for by foreigners and it does not affect the demand for home goods. Of course, if
we consider intermediate cases, where the home government spends on both home and
foreign goods, the conclusion is that only the spending on home goods has any effect. Part
of government spending leaks abroad, increasing the demand for foreign goods. Only the
increase in home goods provides stimulus to the home economy.
When markets are incomplete these negative conclusions are reinforced. The effect of
a spending shock in the home country that is spent entirely on foreign goods is identical
to the response in a complete market setting together with a negative transfer equal to the
present value of the spending shock,
nfa0 = −
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtgF,tdt.
9Note that the size of this devaluation is endogenous and grows without bound as prices become more
flexible i.e. as κ increases. This explains why large multipliers are possible with high values of κ in the
closed economy model: they are associated with large devaluations.
10To see what this implies, suppose the spending shock has a finite life so that gt = 0 for t ≥ T for some
T and that monetary policy targets inflation for t ≥ T. In the closed economy model inflation is always
positive and the price level does not return to its previous level. In contrast, in the open economy model
with a fixed exchange rate (no devaluation) inflation is initially positive but eventually negative and the
price level returns to its initial steady state value. Indeed, if gt > 0 for t < T and gt = 0 for t ≥ T for
some T, then inflation is strictly negative for t ≥ T and the price level falls towards its long run value
asymptotically.
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In the short run, it reduces the domestic demand for home goods, depressing output.
In the long run, output is increased by the standard neoclassical wealth effects on labor
supply. We refer the reader to Section 6.2 below where we provide a detailed analysis of
the effects of such transfers.
5.4 Foreign Government Spending
We now consider the effects of a shock to spending by a foreign country. In particular,
suppose the rest of the world changes its government spending adopting the path {g∗t }
but that spending remains unchanged in the home country so that gt = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
We must take a stand on monetary policy within the union. We assume that monetary
policy adjusts so as to implement the flexible price allocation for the union as a whole.
This amounts to
c∗t = −(1− ξ)g∗t pi∗t = 0 i∗t − ρ = −σˆ(1− ξ)g˙∗t ,
so that at the union level we obtain the neoclassical effect from spending and no inflation.
The interest rate is adjusted depending on the growth rate of spending; if the shock is
transitory, so that g∗0 > 0 and g˙∗t < 0, the interest rate i∗t rises.
To see how this affects the home country we assume, for simplicity, the case of com-
plete markets so that θ = 0. The system is then
p˙iH,t = ρpiH,t − κct + λσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)g∗t ,
c˙t = −σˆ−1piH,t − (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)g˙∗t ,
with the initial condition
c0 = −(1− ξ)g∗0 .
Proposition 7 (Foreign Government Spending). Suppose that markets are complete, then
ct = −eνtα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)g∗0 − (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)g∗t +
ˆ ∞
−t
αc,t,CM∗s gsds,
where
αc,t,CM∗s =
σˆ
−1κ(1− ξ)
[
1+
(
σˆ
σˆ+φ − 1
)
α(ω− 1)
]
e−νs 1−e(ν−ν¯)(s+t)ν¯−ν s < 0,
σˆ−1κ(1− ξ)
[
1+
(
σˆ
σˆ+φ − 1
)
α(ω− 1)
]
e−ν¯s 1−e(ν−ν¯)tν¯−ν s ≥ 0.
There are now both direct effects and indirect effects. The indirect effects work through
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inflation, which affect the terms of trade and, hence, demand for home goods. To simplify
the expressions consider the Cole-Obstfeld case where ω = 1. To isolate the direct effects
set κ = 0, so that there is no inflation and αc,t,CM∗s = 0. The demand for home goods is then
equal to ct = −(1− ξ)g∗t . When foreign spending rises it depresses private spending by
foreigners, lowering the demand for home output. When κ > 0, the indirect effect works
through inflation and is positive in the Cole-Obstfeld case. The lower demand for home
goods creates deflation at home, which makes the economy more competitive. The lower
prices then increase the demand for home goods.11
Example 7 (Foreign Government Spending, AR(1)). Suppose that g∗t = g∗e−ρgt and that
markets are complete, then we have
ct = −eνt(1− ξ)g∗
[
1− 1− e
−(ν+ρg)t
ρg + ν
ρg(ρ+ ρg) + [λ− ρg(ρ+ ρg)]α(ω− 1)
ρg + ν¯
]
.
In the Cole-Obstfeld case, so that ω = 1, this implies that c0 is negative if g∗ is positive. If
ρg + ν < 0 then ct will remain negative. If instead ρg + ν > 0 then ct starts out negative,
but eventually switches signs.
This results suggests that a temporary increase in government spending abroad ac-
companied by monetary tightening to ensure no inflation abroad induces a recession at
home. This fits a common narrative regarding the post German reunification in the early
90s. The fiscal expansion was combined with a monetary contraction in Germany, so as
to avoid inflation. The quasi-fixed exchange rate arrangements of the EMS forced other
countries to follow suit and tighten monetary policy, negatively affecting their economic
performance.
6 Spending Paid by Foreigners and Transfer Multipliers
6.1 Home Government Spending Paid by Foreign
In this section, we examine what happens when the home country “doesn’t pay” for the
increase in government spending at home. We show that this modification can make an
important difference and produce larger multipliers. This consideration is likely to be
important in practice: indeed, a large part of the “local multiplier” literature considers
11As the expressions show, the result that αc,t,CM∗s ≥ 0 holds in the neighborhood of the Cole-Obstfeld
case or whenever ω < 1. Sufficiently away from the Cole-Obstfeld case in the direction of ω > 1 one may
obtain αc,t,CM∗s < 0.
32
experiments where government spending is not paid by the economic unit under consid-
eration.
The only difference with Section 5.1 is that we now have
θ =
ρ
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
nfa0 +Ωρ
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtctdt,
where
nfa0 =
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtgtdt
is the transfer from foreign to home that pays for the increase in government spending.
We provide a closed form solution in the appendix, but the expressions for this closed
form solution are quite involved. Here we focus on two cases that are more tractable and
amenable to clean intuitions: the Cole-Obstfeld case and the case of entirely rigid prices.
In in the Cole-Obstfeld case σ = η = γ = 1, we have Γ = 1 and Ω = 0 .We denote the
consumption multipliers with a superscript PF, which stands for paid for.
Proposition 8 (Spending Paid by Foreign, Cole-Obstfeld). Suppose that government spend-
ing is paid for by foreign, then in the Cole-Obstfeld case σ = η = γ = 1, we have
αc,t,PFs = α
c,t,CM
s + δ
c,t,PF
s ,
where αc,t,CMs is the complete markets consumption multiplier characterized in Proposition 4 and
δc,t,PFs =
[
eνt
1− α
α
− (1− eνt) 1
1− G
1
1
1−G + φ
]
ρe−ρ(s+t).
The sign of δc,t,IMs is the same as that of (tˆ− t); moreover, δc,t,IM−t = ρ1−αα and lims→∞ δc,t,IMs = 0.
When government spending is paid for by foreign, the associated transfer from foreign
to home increases the demand for home goods as long as there is home bias. It also
creates a wealth effect which tends to reduces the output of home goods. In the short
run, output is demand-determined leading to a Keynesian expansion effect on private
consumption. The neoclassical effect only kicks in in the long run when the terms of
trade have appreciated significantly. The Keynesian effect dominates dominates in the
short run and the neoclassical wealth effect dominates in the long run.
Example 8 (Spending Paid by Foreign, Cole-Obstfeld, AR(1)). Suppose that gt = ge−ρgt.
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In the Cole-Obstfeld case σ = η = γ = 1, we have
ct = g
[
eνt
1− α
α
− (1− eνt) 1
1− G
1
1
1−G + φ
]
ρ
ρ+ ρg
− geνt
(
1− e−(ν+ρg)t
ν+ ρg
)
κ(1− ξ) 1− G
ν¯+ ρg
.
Moreover we have c0 = g 1−αα
ρ
ρ+ρg
and limt→∞ ct = −g 11−G 11
1−G+φ
ρ
ρ+ρg
.
Note that the second term on the right hand side of the expression for ct in Proposition
8 is simply the term identified in Proposition 4 in the complete markets case. The first term
is different from the corresponding term in Proposition 6 in the incomplete markets case,
which is simply 0 in the Cole-Obstfeld case. The discrepancy arises precisely because
government spending is now paid for by foreign. This takes the form of a transfer from
foreign to home.
It is particularly useful to look at the predictions of this proposition for t = 0 and
t→ ∞. In the case of a stimulus g > 0, we have c0 > 0 > limt→∞ ct. Following a positive
stimulus shock, we can get c0 > 0 and actually ct > 0 for some time (because θ > 0) and
eventually cˆt < 0. The conclusion would be that an unpaid for fiscal stimulus at home has
a larger consumption multiplier in the short run and smaller in the long run. This is true
as long as there is home bias α < 1. The reason is that the associated transfer redistributes
wealth from foreign to home consumers. This increases the demand for home goods
because of home bias. In the neoclassical model with flexible prices, there would be an
appreciation of the terms of trade and a reduction in the output of home goods because
of a neoclassical wealth effect. With sticky prices, prices cannot adjust in the short term,
and so this appreciation cannot take place right away, and so the output of home goods
increases. In the long run, prices adjust and we get the neoclassical effect.
We now turn to the case of entirely rigid prices.
Proposition 9 (Spending Paid by Foreign, Rigid Prices). Suppose that government spending
is paid for by foreigners and that prices are entirely rigid, then
αc,t,PFs =
1
1−Ω(1− G)(1− α)
1
Γ
1− α
α
ρe−ρ(t+s).
The solution takes a particularly simple form in the case where government spending
follows an AR(1).
Example 9 (Spending Paid by Foreign, Rigid Prices, AR(1)). Suppose that gt = ge−ρgt,
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and that prices are entirely rigid, then
ct = g
1
1−Ω(1− G)(1− α)
1
Γ
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1− α
α
.
With rigid prices, when government spending is not paid by foreign, we have ct = 0.
Instead when government spending is paid by foreign, we have ct > 0 when g > 0. The
annuity value of the transfer received from foreign is simple g ρρ+ρg . The multiplier effect
of this transfer on output is given by 1−αα
1
1−Ω(1−G)(1−α)
1
Γ . In the Cole-Obstfeld case, this
multiplier takes the simple form 1−αα , the relative expenditure share of home goods. Note
that this effect is permanent despite the fact that the government spending shock is mean-
reverting. This is because the effect of the transfer is permanent. We provide a detailed
intuition for this result in Section 6.2 below.
The lesson of this section is that we can partly overturn the conclusion of Proposition
4 when government spending is paid for by foreign. The reason is that the associated
transfer from foreign stimulates private consumption and output.
6.2 Transfer Multipliers
The previous section highlights the role of transfers. We do it in the Cole-Obstfeld case
where σ = η = γ = 1 for simplicity. The next proposition characterizes the response of
the economy to a marginal increase in transfers nfa0. Because the model is linear, we can
represent this dependence by some coefficients βc,t such that
cˆt = βc,tnfa0,
piH,t = β
pi,tnfa0.
Proposition 10 (Transfer Multipliers, Cole-Obstfeld). In the Cole-Obstfeld case σ = η =
γ = 1, transfer multipliers are given by
βc,t = eνtρ
1− α
α
− (1− eνt)ρ 11
1−G + φ
.
We can also compute the effects of transfers on inflation βpi,t = −νeνt
[
ρ1−αα + ρ
1
1
1−G+φ
]
and on the terms of trade βs,t = −[1− eνt]
[
ρ1−αα + ρ
1
1
1−G+φ
]
(note that the terms of trade
gap equals accumulated inflation st = −
´ t
0 piH,sds). The presence of the discount factor ρ
in all these expressions is natural because what matters is the annuity value ρnfa0 of the
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transfer.
Transfers have opposite effects on output in the short and long run. In the short run,
when prices are rigid, there is a Keynesian effect due to the fact that transfers stimulate the
demand for home goods: βc,0 = ρ 1−αα . In the long run, when prices adjust, the neoclassical
wealth effect on labor supply lowers output: limt→∞ βc,t = −ρ 11
1−G+φ
. In the medium run,
the speed of adjustment, from the Keynesian short-run response to the neoclassical long-
run response, is controlled by the degree of price flexibility κ, which affects ν.12
Note that the determinants of the Keynesian and neoclassical wealth effects are very
different. The strength of the Keynesian effect hinges on the relative expenditure share
of home goods 1−αα : the more closed the economy, the larger the Keynesian effect. The
strength of the neoclassical wealth effect depends on the elasticity of labor supply φ: the
more elastic labor supply, the larger the neoclassical wealth effect.
Positive transfers also increase home inflation. The long-run cumulated response in
the price of home produced goods equals ρ1−αα + ρ
1
1
1−G+φ
. The first term ρ1−αα comes from
the fact that transfers increase the demand for home goods, due to home bias. The second
term ρ 11
1−G+φ
is due to a neoclassical wealth effect that reduces labor supply, raising the
wage. How fast this increase in the price of home goods occurs depends positively on the
flexibility of prices through its effect on ν.13
These effects echo the celebrated Transfer Problem controversy of Keynes (1929) and
Ohlin (1929). With home bias, a transfer generates a boom when prices are sticky, and a
real appreciation of the terms of trade when prices are flexible. The neoclassical wealth
effect associated with a transfer comes into play when prices are flexible, and generates
an output contraction and a further real appreciation.
The analysis generalizes away from the Cole-Obstfeld case, but the corresponding
formulas become more involved. However, a simple formula arises in the case where
prices are rigid, in which cases transfer multipliers are constant.
Proposition 11 (Transfer Multipliers, Rigid Prices). When prices are entirely rigid, the trans-
fer multipliers are given by
βc,t =
1
1−Ω(1− G)(1− α)
1
Γ
1− α
α
ρ.
We can also treat the closed economy limit (α = 0) and the fully open economy limit
(α = 1).
12Note that ν is decreasing in κ, with ν = 0 when prices are rigid (κ = 0), and ν = −∞ when prices are
flexible (κ = ∞).
13Recall that ν is decreasing in the degree of price flexibility κ.
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Proposition 12 (Transfer Multipliers). In the closed economy limit we have limα→0 βc,t = ∞.
In the fully open economy limit we have limα→0 βc,t = 0.
The intuition for this proposition is that the Keynesian effect of transfers is commen-
surate with the relative expenditure share on home goods 1−αα . This proposition under-
scores that transfers are much more stimulative than government spending, the more so,
the more closed the economy. This robust negative dependence of transfer multipliers
βc,t on openness α should be contrasted with the lack of clear dependence on openness of
government spending multipliers αc,t,CMs noted above (indeed in the Cole Obstfeld case,
αc,t,CMs is independent of α).
7 Liquidity Constraints and Non-Ricardian Effects
In this section, we explore non-Ricardian effects of fiscal policy in a closed and open
economy setting. To do so, we follow Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Mankiw (2000) and
Gali et al. (2007) and introduce hand-to-mouth consumers, a tractable way of modeling
liquidity constraints. The latter paper studied the effects of government spending under a
Taylor rule in a closed economy. Instead, our focus here is on liquidity traps and currency
unions.
7.1 Hand to Mouth in the Closed Economy
The model is modified as follows. A fraction 1− χ of agents are optimizers, and a fraction
χ are hand-to-mouth. Optimizers are exactly as before. Hand-to-mouth agents cannot
save or borrow, and instead simply consume their labor income in every period, net of
lump-sum taxes trt . These lump-sum taxes are allowed to differ between optimizers (t
o
t )
and hand-to-mouth agents (trt).
We log-linearize around a steady state where optimizers and hand-to-mouth con-
sumers have the same consumption and supply the same labor. In the appendix, we
show that the model can be summarized by the following two equations
c˙t = σ˜−1(it − r¯t − pit) + Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt ,
p˙it = ρpit − κ[ct + (1− ξ)gt],
where σ˜, Θ˜n and Θ˜τ are positive constants defined in the appendix. The presence of
hand-to-mouth consumers introduces two new terms in the Euler equation, one involving
government spending and the other one involving taxes—both direct determinants of the
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consumption of hand-to-mouth agents. These terms drop out without hand-to-mouth
consumers, since χ = 0 implies Θ˜n = Θ˜τ = 0 and σ˜ = σˆ.
As before we define
ν˜ =
ρ−√ρ2 + 4κσ˜−1
2
¯˜ν =
ρ+
√
ρ2 + 4κσ˜−1
2
.
We denote the corresponding multipliers with a HM superscript, which stands for hand-
to-mouth.
Proposition 13 (Closed Economy Multiplier, Hand-to-Mouth). With hand to mouth con-
sumers, we have
ct = Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt +
ˆ ∞
0
αc,HMs gt+sds−
ˆ ∞
0
γc,HMs t
r
t+sds,
where
αc,HMs =
(
1+
Θ˜n
1− ξ
)
α˜c,HMs γ
c,HM
s =
Θ˜τ
1− ξ α˜
c,HM
s .
α˜c,HMs = σ˜
−1κ(1− ξ)e− ˜¯νs
(
e( ˜¯ν−ν˜)s − 1
˜¯ν− ν˜
)
.
With hand-to-mouth consumers, we have additional terms in the closed form solution.
We start with the tax terms. Lower taxes on hand-to-mouth consumers today increases
consumption. This is intuitive since this redistributes income either from future hand-to-
mouth consumers or optimizing agents towards current hand-to-mouth consumers, i.e.
from consumers with a low propensity to consume today out of current income to con-
sumers with a high propensity to consume today out of current income. Lower taxes on
hand-to-mouth consumers in the future stimulates their consumption tomorrow, which
increases inflation today and in the future, reducing the real interest rate and increasing
consumption of optimizing agents today.
We continue with the government spending terms. Higher government spending to-
day increases consumption. This is because government spending increases the income
of current hand to mouth consumers, and hence their consumption. Higher government
spending in the future increases consumption more than in the model with only optimiz-
ing agents. The reason is that government spending in the future partly falls on hand-
to-mouth consumers, stimulating their consumption tomorrow, which increases inflation
today and in the future, reducing the real interest rate and increasing consumption of
optimizing agents today.
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Hence both for taxes and government spending, hand-to-mouth consumers intro-
duces additional traditional Keynesian effects (through the income of current hand-to-
mouth consumers), and additional New-Keynesian effects (through the income of future
hand-to-mouth consumers feeding back into inflation). The New Keynesian effects be-
come more potent when prices are more flexible (when κ increases), which is intuitive
since these effects work through inflation. This is not the case for the Keynesian effects.
It is important to understand how these results depend on fixed interest rates, due,
say, to a binding zero lower bound. Away from this bound, monetary policy could be
chosen to replicate the flexible price allocation with zero inflation. The required nominal
interest rate is impacted by the presence of hand-to-mouth consumers
it = σ˜
[
(1− ξ) + Θ˜n
]
g˙t + σ˜Θ˜τ t˙rt ,
but consumption is not
ct = −(1− ξ)gt.
Hence away from the zero bound, we get the neoclassical multiplier, which is deter-
mined completely statically and does not depend on the presence of hand-to-mouth con-
sumers.14 In contrast, whenever monetary policy does not or cannot replicate the flexible
price allocation, then hand-to-mouth consumers do make a difference for fiscal multipli-
ers. Gali et al. (2007) consider a Taylor rule which falls short of replicating the flexible
price allocation. Here we have focused on fixed interest rates, motivated by liquidity
traps.
Panel (a) in Figure 3 displays the response of consumption over time for an AR(1)
government spending shock. The shock mean reverts quite quickly here. The response
of consumption is non-monotonic in the fraction of hand-to-mouth agents. Higher χ im-
plies there are more hand to mouth consumers and fewer savers. At the same time, future
spending hand-to-mouth agents also contributes to inflation, and hence to current spend-
ing by optimizing agents. Which of these effects dominates is ambiguous. Overall, for
our simulations, more hand-to-mouth agents means higher multipliers at impact, but the
effect reverses at some point in time. This figure makes clear that the interplay between
the increase in future spending by hand-to-mouth agents, the inflation that it generates,
and the current and future spending decisions of optimizing agents is extremely potent
and can generate very large multipliers.
14Note however that hand-to-mouth agents might change the associated allocation of optimizers. They
just don’t matter for the aggregate allocation.
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7.2 Hand to Mouth in the Open Economy
We now turn to the open economy version with hand to mouth agents. In the appendix,
we show that the system becomes
p˙iH,t = ρpiH,t − κ˜(ct + (1− ξ)gt)− (1− G)λσ˜α˜ω˜θ,
c˙t = −σ˜−1piH,t + Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt ,
with initial condition
c0 = Θ˜ng0 − Θ˜τtr0,
for some constants κ˜, α˜, ω˜, σ˜, Θ˜n and Θ˜τ defined in the appendix. As usual, we define
ν˜ =
ρ−√ρ2 + 4κσ˜−1
2
¯˜ν =
ρ+
√
ρ2 + 4κσ˜−1
2
.
Proposition 14 (Complete Markets). With hand-to-mouth agents and complete markets for
optimizers, we have
ct = Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt +
ˆ ∞
−t
αc,t,HMs gt+sds−
ˆ ∞
−t
γc,t,HMs t
r
t+sds,
where
αc,t,HMs =
(
1+
Θ˜n
1− ξ
)
α˜c,ts γ
c,t,HM
s =
Θ˜τ
1− ξ α˜
c,t
s
α˜c,ts =
−σ˜−1κ(1− ξ)e−ν˜s 1−e
(ν˜− ˜¯ν)(s+t)
˜¯ν−ν˜ s < 0
−σ˜−1κ(1− ξ)e− ˜¯νs 1−e−( ˜¯ν−ν˜)t˜¯ν−ν˜ s ≥ 0
Just as in the closed economy case, hand-to-mouth consumers introduce additional
Keynesian effects (through the spending of current hand-to-mouth agents) and New Key-
nesian effects through cumulated inflation (via past and future hand-to-mouth agents).
Just as in the closed economy case, the Keynesian effects increase consumption in re-
sponse to contemporaneous positive government spending shocks. The difference with
the closed economy case is that the New Keynesian effects tend to depress consumption
in response to positive government spending shocks. A pure illustration of the Keyne-
sian effect is initial consumption c0 (for which New Keynesian effects are 0), which is not
0 anymore, but instead c0 = Θ˜ng0 − Θ˜τtr0.
The right panel of Figure 3 displays consumption over time for an AR(1) government
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Figure 3: Consumption response to an AR1 government spending shock with mean re-
version ρg = 0.8 (with a half life of
log 2
ρg
≈ .87), for with different fractions χ of hand-
to-mouth agents: χ = 0 (blue), χ = 0.075 (green) and χ = 0.15 (red). Panel (a) shows
liquidity trap case while panel (b) shows the currency union case. Parameters are σ = 1,
η = γ = 1, e = 6, φ = 3, λ = 0.14 and α = 0.4.
spending shock. The higher the fraction χ of hand to mouth agents, the higher the initial
response of consumption. At impact, more hand-to-mouth agents means more Keynesian
effects through the spending of hand to mouth agents but less new New-Keynesian effects
through the spending of optimizing agents. More hand-to-mouth agents unambiguously
raises aggregate spending at impact. The effect reverses at some point in time because of
the higher terms of trade appreciation when there are more hand-to-mouth agents (and
current and future government spending is small).
References
Acconcia, Antonio, Giancarlo Corsetti, and Saverio Simonelli, “Mafia and Public
Spending: Evidence on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-experiment,” CEPR Discus-
sion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers April 2011.
Auerbach, Alan and Yuriy Gorodnichenko, “Fiscal Multipliers in Recession and Expan-
sion,” in “Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis” NBER Chapters, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc, 2012.
41
Barro, Robert J. and Charles J. Redlick, “Macroeconomic Effects from Government Pur-
chases and Taxes,” NBER Working Papers 15369, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Inc September 2009.
Campbell, John Y. and N. Gregory Mankiw, “Consumption, Income and Interest Rates:
Reinterpreting the Time Series Evidence,” in “NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1989,
Volume 4” NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 1989, pp. 185–
246.
Chodorow-Reich, G., L. Feiveson, Z. Liscow, and W.G. Woolston, “Does State Fiscal Re-
lief During Recessions Increase Employment? Evidence from the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act,” University of California at Berkeley Working Paper 2011.
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo, “When Is the Govern-
ment Spending Multiplier Large?,” Journal of Political Economy, 2011, 119 (1), 78–121.
Clemens, J. and S. Miran, “The Effects of State Budget Cuts on Employment and In-
come,” Harvard University Working Paper 2010.
Cohen, Lauren, Joshua D. Coval, and Christopher Malloy, “Do Powerful Politicians
Cause Corporate Downsizing?,” NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc March 2010.
Cole, Harold L. and Maurice Obstfeld, “Commodity Trade and International Risk Shar-
ing: How Much Do Financial Markets Matter?,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 1991, 28
(1), 3–24.
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Keith Kuester, and Gernot J. Muller, “Floats, Pegs and the Trans-
mission of Fiscal Policy,” Journal Economia Chilena (The Chilean Economy), August 2011,
14 (2), 5–38.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, “Exchange Rate Economics: Where Do We Stand?,” Brookings Pa-
pers on Economic Activity, 1980, 11 (1, Tenth), 143–206.
Eggertsson, Gauti B., “What Fiscal Policy is Effective at Zero Interest Rates?,” in “NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2010, Volume 25” NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Inc, 2011, pp. 59–112.
Erceg, Christopher J. and Jesper Linde, “Fiscal Consolidation in an Open Economy,”
American Economic Review, May 2012, 102 (3), 186–91.
42
Farhi, Emmanuel and Ivan Werning, “Dealing with the Trilemma: Optimal Capital Con-
trols with Fixed Exchange Rates,” NBER Working Papers 18199, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc June 2012.
and , “Fiscal Unions,” NBER Working Papers 18280, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc June 2012.
Fishback, Price V. andValentina Kachanovskaya, “In Search of the Multiplier for Federal
Spending in the States During the Great Depression,” NBER Working Papers, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc November 2010.
Gali, Jordi and Tommaso Monacelli, “Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in
a Small Open Economy,” Review of Economic Studies, 07 2005, 72 (3), 707–734.
and , “Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union,” Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, September 2008, 76 (1), 116–132.
, J. David Lopez-Salido, and Javier Valles, “Understanding the Effects of Government
Spending on Consumption,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 03 2007, 5 (1),
227–270.
Gordon, Robert J. and Robert Krenn, “The End of the Great Depression 1939-41: Policy
Contributions and Fiscal Multipliers,” NBER Working Papers 16380, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc September 2010.
Keynes, J.M., “The German transfer problem,” The Economic Journal, 1929, 39 (153), 1–7.
Mankiw, Gregory N., “The Savers-Spenders Theory of Fiscal Policy,” American Economic
Review, May 2000, 90 (2), 120–125.
Nakamura, Emi and Jon Steinsson, “Fiscal Stimulus in a Monetary Union: Evidence
from U.S. Regions,” NBER Working Papers 17391, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Inc September 2011.
Ohlin, B., “The reparation problem: a discussion,” Economic Journal, 1929, 39 (154), 172–
182.
Ramey, Valerie A., “Can Government Purchases Stimulate the Ecnomy?,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 2011, 49 (3), 673–685.
Serrato, J. C. S. and P. Wingender, “Estimating Local Multipliers,” University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley Working Paper 2010.
43
Shoag, Danny, “The Impact of Government Spending Shocks: Evidence on the Multiplier
from State Pension Plan Returns,” Harvard University Working Paper 2010.
Werning, Ivan, “Managing a Liquidity Trap: Monetary and Fiscal Policy,” 2012. NBER
Working Papers.
Woodford, Michael, “Simple Analytics of the Government Expenditure Multiplier,”
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, January 2011, 3 (1), 1–35.
A Proof of Proposition 1
We need to solve the system
c˙t = σˆ−1 (it − pit − rt) ,
p˙it = ρpit − κ (ct + (1− Γ)gt) .
Equivalently
c¨t − ρc˙t − σˆ−1κ (ct + (1− Γ)gt) = 0.
which has characteristic roots
ν¯ =
ρ+
√
ρ2 + 4σˆ−1κ
2
ν =
ρ−√ρ2 + 4σˆ−1κ
2
.
Based on these we make the guess that
ct = A
ˆ
t
e−ν¯(z−t)gzdz− A
ˆ
t
e−ν(z−t)gzdz
for some constant A and verify that
c˙t = −Agt + ν¯A
ˆ
t
e−ν¯(z−t)gzdz + Agt − νA
ˆ
t
e−ν(z−t)gzdz,
= ν¯A
ˆ
t
e−ν¯(z−t)gzdz− νA
ˆ
t
e−ν(z−t)gzdz,
c¨t = ν¯2A
ˆ
t
e−ν¯(z−t)gzds− ν2A
ˆ
t
e−ν¯(z−t)gzds + (−ν¯+ ν)Agt.
This implies that
c¨t − ρc˙t − σ−1κ (ct + (1− Γ)gt) =
(
(−ν¯+ ν)A− σ−1κ(1− Γ)
)
gt = 0.
44
if and only if
A =
σˆ−1κ(1− Γ)
(−ν¯+ ν) = −
σˆ−1κ(1− Γ)√
ρ2 + 4σ−1κ
.
Hence we can write
ct =
σˆ−1κ(1− Γ)√
ρ2 + 4σ−1κ
ˆ ∞
0
(
e(ν¯−ν)s − 1
)
e−ν¯sgt+sds.
To characterize the properties of the multiplier write
αcs =
(
∆2 − ρ2) (1− Γ)
4∆
(
e∆s − 1
)
e−
ρ+∆
2 s,
where ∆ =
√
ρ2 + 4σˆ−1κ, the claims that αc0 = 0 and α
c
s > 0 for s > 0 are immediate.
The first derivative is
∂αcs
∂s
=
(
∆2 − ρ2) (1− Γ)
4∆
(
∆e∆se−
ρ+∆
2 s − ρ+ ∆
2
(
e∆s − 1
)
e−
ρ+∆
2 s
)
,
=
(
∆2 − ρ2) (1− Γ)
4∆
(
ρ+ ∆
2
+
∆− ρ
2
e∆s
)
e−
ρ+∆
2 s > 0,
since ∆ > ρ as long as κ > 0. The second derivative is
∂2αcs
∂s2
(s) = e−
ρ+∆
2 s
(
−ρ+ ∆
2
(
ρ+ ∆
2
+
∆− ρ
2
e∆s
)
+ ∆
∆− ρ
2
e∆s
)
,
= e−
ρ+∆
2 s
(
−
(
ρ+ ∆
2
)2
+
(
∆− ρ
2
)2
e∆s
)
> 0.
Define s¯ by the condition that
−
(
ρ+ ∆
2
)2
+
(
∆− ρ
2
)2
e∆s¯ = 0.
then αcs is locally strictly convex for all s ≥ s¯. It follows that αcs is unbounded.
B Proof of Proposition 2
The two limits are immediate. To establish monotonicity, we use brute force to compute
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∂αcs
∂∆
=
(1− Γ)
2
(
e∆s − 1
)
e−
ρ+∆
2 s −
(
∆2 − ρ2) (1− Γ)
4∆2
(
e∆s − 1
)
e−
ρ+∆
2 s
+
(
∆2 − ρ2) (1− Γ)
4∆
se∆se−
ρ+∆
2 s
+
(
∆2 − ρ2) (1− Γ)
4∆
(
e∆s − 1
)
e−
ρ+∆
2 s
(
−1
2
s
)
.
Rearranging we get
e
ρ+∆
2 s
∂αcs
∂∆
=
1
2
(
1− ∆
2 − ρ2
2∆2
)
(1− Γ)
(
e∆s − 1
)
+
1
2
(
∆2 − ρ2) (1− Γ)
4∆
se∆s +
(
∆2 − ρ2) (1− Γ)
4∆
so that all terms are positive.
C Proof of Proposition 4
With complete markets, θ = 0. Imagine an experiment where i∗t = ρ, g∗t = y∗t = c∗t = 0
= 0. If gt = 0 throughout then yt = ct = 0. The system becomes
p˙iH,t = ρpiH,t − κ [ct + (1− ξ)gt] ,
c˙t = −σˆ−1piH,t,
c0 = 0.
Let Xt = [piH,t, ct]′, Bt = [−κ(1− ξ)gt, 0]′ = −κ(1− ξ)gtE1 and A =
[
ρ −κ
−σˆ−1 0
]
.
We have X˙t = AXt + Bt. The matrix A has one positive and one negative eigenvalue.
The negative eigenvalue is given by ν = ρ−
√
ρ2+4κσˆ−1
2 . The associated eigenvector is
Xν = [−νσˆ, 1]′. The solution is
Xt = ανeνtXν + κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gse−A(s−t)E1ds,
where X0 and αν solve the system of three equations in three unknowns
X0 − κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gte−AtE1dt = ανXν,
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E′2X0 = (1− G)(1− α)θ.
The solution is
αν = −κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
E′2gte−AtE1dt,
piH,0 = κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gtE′1e
−AtE1dt + νσˆκ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
E′2gte−AtE1dt,
c0 = 0.
Hence we have
ct = −eνtκ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gtE′2e−AtE1dt + κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gsE′2e−A(s−t)E1ds,
piH,t = νσˆeνtκ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gtE′2e−AtE1dt + κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gsE′1e
−A(s−t)E1ds.
Denote the positive eigenvalue of A by ν¯ = ρ+
√
ρ2+4κσˆ−1
2 and the corresponding eigen-
vector by Xν¯ = [−ν¯σˆ, 1]′. We have E1 = 1(ν¯−ν)σˆ (Xν − Xν¯). Hence we can write
ct = −eνtκ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gtE′2e−At
1
(ν¯− ν)σˆ (Xν − Xν¯)dt
+ κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gsE′2e−A(s−t)
1
(ν¯− ν)σˆ (Xν − Xν¯)ds,
piH,t = νσˆeνtκ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gtE′2e−At
1
(ν¯− ν)σˆ (Xν − Xν¯)dt
+ κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gsE′1e
−A(s−t) 1
(ν¯− ν)σˆ (Xν − Xν¯)ds.
We get
ct = −eνtκ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gt
1
σˆ
e−νt − e−ν¯t
ν¯− ν dt + κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gs
1
σˆ
e−ν(s−t) − e−ν¯(s−t)
ν¯− ν ds,
piH,t = νσˆeνtκ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gt
1
σˆ
e−νt − e−ν¯t
ν¯− ν dt + κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gs
νe−ν(s−t) − ν¯e−ν¯(s−t)
ν− ν¯ ds.
Now suppose that gt = ge−ρgt. Then
ct = −eνt
(
1− e−(ν+ρg)t
)
κ(1− ξ)g
[
E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1
]
,
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where
A + ρg I =
[
ρ+ ρg −κ
−σˆ−1 ρg
]
,
(A + ρg I)−1 =
1
ρg(ρ+ ρg)− κσˆ−1
[
ρg κ
σˆ−1 ρ+ ρg
]
,
so that
E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 =
σˆ−1
ρg(ρ+ ρg)− κσˆ−1 .
D Proof of Proposition 6
Let Xt = [piH,t, ct]′, Bt = [−κ(1 − ξ)gt − (1 − G)λσˆαωθ, 0]′ = −κ(1 − ξ)gtE1 − (1 −
G)λσˆαωθE1 and A =
[
ρ −κ
−σˆ−1 0
]
. We have X˙t = AXt + Bt. The matrix A has one pos-
itive and one negative eigenvalue. The negative eigenvalue is given by ν = ρ−
√
ρ2+4κσˆ−1
2 .
The associated eigenvector is Xν = [−νσˆ, 1]′. The solution is
Xt = ανeνtXν + κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gse−A(s−t)E1ds + (1− G)λσˆαωθA−1E1,
where X0, αν and θ solve the system of four equations in four unknowns
X0 − κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gte−AtE1dt− (1− G)λσˆαωθA−1E1 = ανXν,
E′2X0 = (1− G)(1− α)θ,
θ = Ω
[
ρ
ρ− ναν + θ(1− G)λσˆαωE
′
2A
−1E1 + κ(1− ξ)ρ
ˆ ∞
0
gse−ρsE′2(A− ρI)−1(1− e−(A−ρI)s)E1ds
]
.
We find
θ
[
(1− G)(1− α)− (1− G)λσˆαωE′2A−1E1
]
− κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gtE′2e−AtE1dt = αν,
θ = Ω
[
ρ
ρ− ναν + θ(1− G)λσˆαωE
′
2A
−1E1 + κ(1− ξ)ρ
ˆ ∞
0
gse−ρsE′2(A− ρI)−1(1− e−(A−ρI)s)E1ds
]
.
We then have
ct = −eνtκ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gtE′2e−AtE1dt + κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gsE′2e−A(s−t)E1ds
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+ θ
[
(1− G)(1− α)eνt − (1− eνt)(1− G)σˆ αω
1+ φ
]
,
θ =
Ωκ(1− ξ)
[
− ρρ−ν
´ ∞
0 gtE
′
2e
−AtE1dt + ρ
´ ∞
0 gse
−ρsE′2(A− ρI)−1(1− e−(A−ρI)s)E1ds
]
1−Ω
[
ρ
ρ−ν (1− G)(1− α) + νρ−ν (1− G)σˆ αω1+φ
] .
Recall that E1 = 1(ν¯−ν)σˆ (Xν − Xν¯). We can therefore rewrite
ct = −eνtκ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gt
1
σˆ
e−νt − e−ν¯t
ν¯− ν dt + κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gs
1
σˆ
e−ν(s−t) − e−ν¯(s−t)
ν¯− ν ds,
+ θ
[
(1− G)(1− α)eνt − (1− eνt)(1− G)σˆ αω
1+ φ
]
,
θ =
Ωκ(1− ξ)
[
− ρρ−ν
´ ∞
0 gtσˆ
−1( e−νt−e−ν¯tν¯−ν )dt + ρ
´ ∞
0 gse
−ρsσˆ−1
1−e−(ν−ρ)s
ν−ρ − 1−e
−(ν¯−ρ)s
ν¯−ρ
ν¯−ν ds
]
1−Ω
[
ρ
ρ−ν (1− G)(1− α) + νρ−ν (1− G)σˆ αω1+φ
] .
Suppose that gt = ge−ρgt. We can solve αν and θ as the solution of the following system
of two equations in two unknowns
αν + θ
[
(1− G)λσˆαωE′2A−1E1 − (1− G)(1− α)
]
= −gκ(1− ξ)E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1,
− αν
(
ω
σ − 1
)
σˆ
1+ (1− G) (ωσ − 1) σˆ(1− α) ρρ− νE′2Xν+ θ
[
1− (1− G)
(
ω
σ − 1
)
σˆ
1+ (1− G) (ωσ − 1) σˆ(1− α)λσˆαωE′2A−1E1
]
=
(
ω
σ − 1
)
σˆ
1+ (1− G) (ωσ − 1) σˆ(1− α)
[
κ(1− ξ)g ρ
ρ+ ρg
E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1
]
.
where
E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 =
σˆ−1
ρg(ρ+ ρg)− κσˆ−1 ,
which is of the same sign as ν+ ρg. Hence we get that θ is of the same sign as 1− ωσ (for
ω
σ close to 1) where ω = σγ+ (1− α)(ση − 1). And then we can solve
ct =
[
eνt(1− G)(1− α) + (1− eνt)(1− G)λσˆαωE′2A−1E1
]
θ
− eνt
(
1− e−(ν+ρg)t
)
gκ(1− ξ)E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1.
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E Proof of Proposition 8
We have
nfa0 =
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtgtdt.
The system is
p˙iH,t = ρpiH,t − κ[ct + (1− ξ)gt]− (1− G)λσˆαωθ,
c˙t = −σˆ−1piH,t,
c0 = (1− G)(1− α)θ,
θ =
ρ
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtgtdt +Ωρ
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtctdt.
The solution is
Xt = ανeνtXν + (1− G)λσˆαωθA−1E1 + κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gse−A(s−t)E1ds,
where X0 and αν solve the system of three equations in three unknowns
X0 − (1− G)λσˆαωθA−1E1 − κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gte−AtE1dt = ανXν,
E′2X0 = (1− G)(1− α)θ,
θ =
ρ
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtgtdt
+Ω[
ρ
ρ+ ν
αν + (1− G)λσˆαωθE′2A−1E1
+ κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gtE′2e−AtE1dt− κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gte−ρtE′2e−AtE1dt].
The Cole Obstfeld case. In the Cole-Obstfeld case, we get
αν =
[
(1− G)(1− α)− λαE′2A−1E1
] ρ
α
1
1− G
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtgtdt− κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gtE′2e−AtE1dt,
ct =
[
ρ
α
1
1− G
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtgtdt
] [
(1− G)(1− α)eνt + (1− eνt)λαE′2A−1E1
]
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− eνtκ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gtE′2e−AtE1dt + κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gsE′2e−A(s−t)E1ds.
We now specialize to gt = ge−ρgt. We find
αν =
[
(1− G)(1− α)− λαE′2A−1E1
] ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G g− κ(1− ξ)gE
′
2(A + ρg I)
−1E1,
ct = g
[
eνt(1− G)(1− α)− (1− eνt)λα
κ
]
1
1− G
1
α
ρ
ρ+ ρg
− geνt
(
1− e−(ν+ρg)t
ν+ ρg
)
κ(1− ξ) 1− G
ν¯+ ρg
.
We see that c0 = g 1−αα
ρ
ρ+ρg
and limt→∞ ct = −g 11−G λκ ρρ+ρg . Hence in the case of a stimulus
g > 0, we have c0 > 0 > limt→∞ ct.
F Proof of Proposition 9
Here we assume that prices are entirely rigid. The system becomes
c˙t = 0,
c0 = (1− G)(1− α)θ,
θ =
ρ
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtgtdt +Ωρ
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtctdt.
The solution is
ct =
(1− G)(1− α)
1−Ω(1− G)(1− α)
ρ
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρsgsds,
θ =
1
1−Ω(1− G)(1− α)
ρ
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtgtdt.
In the special case where gt = ge−ρgt, we get
ct =
(1− G)(1− α)
1−Ω(1− G)(1− α)
1
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
ρ
ρ+ ρg
g,
θ =
1
1−Ω(1− G)(1− α)
1
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
ρ
ρ+ ρg
g.
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G Closed Form Solution for Government Spending Paid
by Foreign, General Case
We specialize to gt = ge−ρgt. The system becomes
X0 − (1− G)λσˆαωθA−1E1 − κ(1− ξ)g(A + ρg I)−1E1 = ανXν,
E′2X0 = (1− G)(1− α)θ,
θ =
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
g
+Ω[
ρ
ρ+ ν
αν + (1− G)λσˆαωθE′2A−1E1
+ κ(1− ξ)gE′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 − κ(1− ξ)E′2g(A + (ρ+ ρg)I)−1E]1.
The solution is
αν = (1− G)(1− α)θ
[
1− α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
− κ(1− ξ)gE′2(A + ρg I)−1E1,
θ =
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
g +Ω[
ρ
ρ+ ν
αν + (1− G)λσˆαωθE′2A−1E1
+ κ(1− ξ)gE′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 − κ(1− ξ)E′2g(A + (ρ+ ρg)I)−1E1].
We can solve further. Define
Γ˜ = 1−Ω(1− G)λσˆαωθE′2A−1E1
Γˆ =
[
1− (1− G)(1− α)
[
1− α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
1
Γ˜
Ω
ρ
ρ+ ν
]
,
and
Ωˆ = (1− G)(1− α)
[
1− α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
1
Γ˜
1
Γˆ
Ωκ(1− ξ)[E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1
− E′2(A + (ρ+ ρg)I)−1E1],
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Ω˜ =
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
[
1
Γ
1
Γ˜
− 1
]
+
1
Γ˜
Ω
ρ
ρ+ ν
[− 1
Γˆ
κ(1− ξ)E′2(A + ρg)−1E1
+ (1− G)(1− α)
[
1− α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
1
ΓΓ˜Γˆ
+ Ωˆ]
+ κ(1− ξ) 1
Γ˜
Ω[E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 − E′2g(A + (ρ+ ρg)I)−1E1],
and
¯¯Ω =
[
1
ΓΓ˜Γˆ
− 1
]
(1− G)(1− α)
[
1− α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
+ Ωˆ−
(
1
Γˆ
− 1
)
κ(1− ξ)E′2(A + ρg)−1E1.
We have
θ =
1
Γ˜
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
g
+
1
Γ˜
Ω[
ρ
ρ+ ν
αν + κ(1− ξ)gE′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 − κ(1− ξ)E′2g(A + (ρ+ ρg)I)−1E1],
αν = −κ(1− ξ)gE′2(A + ρg I)−1E1
+ (1− G)(1− α)
[
1− α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
1
Γ˜
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
g
+ (1− G)(1− α)
[
1− α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
1
Γ˜
Ω[
ρ
ρ+ ν
αν
+ κ(1− ξ)gE′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 − κ(1− ξ)E′2g(A + (ρ+ ρg)I)−1E1].
We find
αν = −g 1
Γˆ
κ(1− ξ)E′2(A + ρg)−1E1
+ g(1− G)(1− α)
[
1− α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
1
ΓΓ˜Γˆ
+ gΩˆ.
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We can now replace to find θ:
θ =
1
Γ˜
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
g +
1
Γ˜
Ω
ρ
ρ+ ν
αν
+ gκ(1− ξ) 1
Γ˜
Ω[E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 − E′2g(A + (ρ+ ρg)I)−1E1],
θ = g
1
Γ˜
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
+ g
1
Γ˜
Ω
ρ
ρ+ ν
[− 1
Γˆ
κ(1− ξ)E′2(A + ρg)−1E1
+ (1− G)(1− α)
[
1− α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
1
ΓΓ˜Γˆ
+ Ωˆ]
+ gκ(1− ξ) 1
Γ˜
Ω[E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 − E′2g(A + (ρ+ ρg)I)−1E1],
θ = g
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
1
Γ
1
Γ˜
+ g
1
Γ˜
Ω
ρ
ρ+ ν
[− 1
Γˆ
κ(1− ξ)E′2(A + ρg)−1E1
+ (1− G)(1− α)
[
1− α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
1
ΓΓ˜Γˆ
+ Ωˆ]
+ gκ(1− ξ) 1
Γ˜
Ω[E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 − E′2g(A + (ρ+ ρg)I)−1E1],
θ = g
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
+ g
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
[
1
Γ
1
Γ˜
− 1
]
+ g
1
Γ˜
Ω
ρ
ρ+ ν
[− 1
Γˆ
κ(1− ξ)E′2(A + ρg)−1E1
+ (1− G)(1− α)
[
1− α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
1
ΓΓ˜Γˆ
+ Ωˆ]
+ gκ(1− ξ) 1
Γ˜
Ω[E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 − E′2g(A + (ρ+ ρg)I)−1E1],
θ = g
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G + gΩ˜.
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We can plug back into
Xt = ανeνtXν + (1− G)λσˆαωθA−1E1 + κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gse−A(s−t)E1ds.
We get
ct = ανeνt + (1− G)λσˆαωθE′2A−1E1 + ge−ρgtκ(1− ξ)E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1,
which we can rewrite as
ct = gκ(1− ξ)E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1eνt(1− e−(ν+ρg)t)
+ g(1− G)(1− α)
[
eνt + (1− eνt) α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
+ gΩ˜(1− G)λσˆαωE′2A−1E1
+ g
[
1
ΓΓ˜Γˆ
− 1
]
(1− G)(1− α)
[
1− α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G e
νt
+ gΩˆeνt − g
(
1
Γˆ
− 1
)
κ(1− ξ)E′2(A + ρg)−1E1eνt,
or
ct = gκ(1− ξ)E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1eνt(1− e−(ν+ρg)t)
+ g(1− G)(1− α)
[
eνt + (1− eνt) α
1− αλσˆωE
′
2A
−1E1
]
ρ
ρ+ ρg
1
α
1
1− G
+ gΩ˜(1− G)λσˆαωE′2A−1E1 + geνt ¯¯Ω.
H Proof of Proposition 7
With active monetary policy, we have i∗t − ρ = −σˆ(1− ξ)g˙∗t and c∗t = −(1− ξ)g∗t . With
complete markets, θ = 0. The system is
p˙iH,t = ρpiH,t − κct + λσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)g∗t ,
c˙t = −σˆ−1piH,t − (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)g˙∗t ,
c0 = −(1− ξ)g∗0 .
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The solution is
Xt = ανeνtXν−λσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
g∗s e−A(s−t)E1ds+(1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
g˙∗s e−A(s−t)E2ds,
or
Xt = ανeνtXν − λσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
g∗s e−A(s−t)E1ds
− (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)g∗t E2 + (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
g∗s Ae−A(s−t)E2ds,
where X0 and αν solve the system of three equations in three unknowns
X0 + λσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
g∗s e−AsE1ds + (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)g∗0 E2
− (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
g∗s Ae−AsE2ds = ανXν,
E′2X0 = −(1− ξ)g∗0 .
We get
− α(ω− 1)(1− ξ)g∗0 + λσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
g∗s E′2e−AsE1ds
− (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
g∗s Ae−AsE2ds = αν,
and
ct = −eνtα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)g∗0 − (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)g∗t
+ eνtλσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
g∗s E′2e−AsE1ds− λσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
g∗s E′2e−A(s−t)E1ds
− eνt(1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
g∗s E′2Ae−AsE2ds+(1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
g∗s E′2Ae−A(s−t)E2ds.
Using E1 = 1(ν¯−ν)σˆ (Xν − Xν¯) and E2 = 1(ν¯−ν)(ν¯Xν − νXν¯), we can rewrite this as
ct = −eνtα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)g∗0 − (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)g∗t
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+ eνtλσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
g∗s E′2e−As
1
(ν¯− ν)σˆ (Xν − Xν¯)ds
− λσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
g∗s E′2e−A(s−t)
1
(ν¯− ν)σˆ (Xν − Xν¯)ds
− eνt(1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
g∗s E′2Ae−As
1
(ν¯− ν) (ν¯Xν − νXν¯)ds
+ (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
g∗s E′2Ae−A(s−t)
1
(ν¯− ν) (ν¯Xν − νXν¯)ds,
or
ct = −eνtα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)g∗0 − (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)g∗t
+ eνtλσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
g∗s
1
σˆ
e−νs − e−ν¯s
ν¯− ν ds
− λσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
g∗s
1
σˆ
e−ν(s−t) − e−ν¯(s−t)
ν¯− ν ds
− eνt(1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
g∗s ν¯ν
e−νs − e−ν¯s
ν¯− ν ds
+ (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
g∗s ν¯ν
e−ν(s−t) − e−ν¯(s−t)
ν¯− ν ds,
or
ct = −eνtα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)g∗0 − (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)g∗t
+ eνtσˆ
α
σˆ+ φ
(ω− 1)σˆ−1κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
g∗s
e−νs − e−ν¯s
ν¯− ν ds
− σˆ α
σˆ+ φ
(ω− 1)σˆ−1κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
g∗s
e−ν(s−t) − e−ν¯(s−t)
ν¯− ν ds
eνt(1− α(ω− 1))σˆ−1κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
g∗s
e−νs − e−ν¯s
ν¯− ν ds
− (1− α(ω− 1))σˆ−1κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
g∗s
e−ν(s−t) − e−ν¯(s−t)
ν¯− ν ds,
or
ct = −eνtα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)g∗0 − (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)g∗t
+ eνtσˆ−1κ(1− ξ)
[
σˆ
α
σˆ+ φ
(ω− 1) + (1− α(ω− 1))
] ˆ ∞
0
g∗s
e−νs − e−ν¯s
ν¯− ν ds
− σˆ−1κ(1− ξ)
[
σˆ
α
σˆ+ φ
(ω− 1) + (1− α(ω− 1))
] ˆ ∞
t
g∗s
e−ν(s−t) − e−ν¯(s−t)
ν¯− ν ds.
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In the case where g∗t = g∗e−ρgt, we get
Xt = ανeνtXν − λσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)g∗e−ρgt(A + ρg I)−1E1
− (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)ρgg∗e−ρgt(A + ρg I)−1E2,
− (1− ξ)g∗0 + λσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)g∗E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1
+ (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)ρgg∗E′2(A + ρg I)−1E2 = αν,
so that
ct = −eνt(1− ξ)g∗0
+ eνtλσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)g∗E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 − λσˆα(ω− 1)(1− ξ)g∗e−ρgtE′2(A + ρg I)−1E1
+ eνt(1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)ρgg∗E′2(A+ ρg I)−1E2− (1− α(ω− 1))(1− ξ)ρgg∗e−ρgtE′2(A+ ρg I)−1E2,
or
ct = −eνt(1− ξ)g∗0
+ eνt(1− e−(ν+ρg)t)(1− ξ)g∗
[
λσˆα(ω− 1)E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 + (1− α(ω− 1))ρgE′2(A + ρg I)−1E2
]
.
We use
(A + ρg I)−1 =
1
ρg(ρ+ ρg)− κσˆ−1
[
ρg κ
σˆ−1 ρ+ ρg
]
,
E′2(A + ρg I)−1E1 =
σˆ−1
ρg(ρ+ ρg)− κσˆ−1 ,
E′2(A + ρg I)−1E2 =
ρ+ ρg
ρg(ρ+ ρg)− κσˆ−1 ,
to get
ct = −eνt(1− ξ)g∗0 + eνt(1− e−(ν+ρg)t)(1− ξ)g∗
λα(ω− 1) + (1− α(ω− 1))ρg(ρ+ ρg)
ρg(ρ+ ρg)− κσˆ−1 .
In the Cole-Obstfeld case with g∗t = g∗e−ρgt, the solution is simple. We get
Xt = ανeνtXν − e−ρgt(1− ξ)ρgg∗(A + ρg I)−1E2,
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where X0 and αν solve the system of three equations in three unknowns
X0 + (1− ξ)ρgg∗(A + ρg I)−1E2 = ανXν,
E′2X0 = −(1− ξ)g∗.
We get
αν = (1− ξ)g∗
[
ρg(ρ+ ρg)
ρg(ρ+ ρg)− κ(1− G) − 1
]
,
and hence
ct = −eνt(1− ξ)g∗
[
1−
(
1− e−(ρg+ν)t
) ρg(ρ+ ρg)
ρg(ρ+ ρg)− κ(1− G)
]
.
I Derivation of the Loglinearization in Section 7.1
We have the following aggregation equations:
ct = χcrt + (1− χ)cot ,
nt = χnrt + (1− χ)not .
We have the following conditions characterizing the solution of the agents’ problems:
c˙ot = (1− G)σ−1(it − r¯t − pit),
crt =
WNr
Y
(wt + nrt)− trt ,
wt =
σ
1− G c
r
t + φn
r
t .
wt =
σ
1− G ct + φnt,
where wt denotes real wages.
Combining and re-arranging, we get
nrt = φ
−1(wt − σ1− G c
r
t),
crt =
WNr
Y
[(1+ φ−1)( σ
1− G ct + φnt)− φ
−1 σ
1− G c
r
t ]− trt ,
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crt =
WNr
Y (1+ φ
−1)( σ1−G ct + φnt)− trt
1+ φ−1 σ1−G
WNr
Y
,
ct
[
1− χWNrY σ1−G + (1− χ)φ−1 σ1−G WN
r
Y
1+ φ−1 σ1−G
WNr
Y
]
= χ
WNr
Y (1+ φ
−1)φnt − trt
1+ φ−1 σ1−G
WNr
Y
+ (1− χ)cot ,
ct = χ
WNr
Y (1+ φ
−1)φnt − trt
1− χWNrY σ1−G + (1− χ)φ−1 σ1−G WN
r
Y
+(1−χ) 1+ φ
−1 σ
1−G
WNr
Y
1− χWNrY σ1−G + (1− χ)φ−1 σ1−G WN
r
Y
cot ,
ct = χ
φ(1+ φ)nt − YWNrφtrt
Y
WNrφ− χ σ1−Gφ+ (1− χ) σ1−G
+ (1− χ)
Y
WNrφ+
σ
1−G
Y
WNrφ− χ σ1−Gφ+ (1− χ) σ1−G
cot ,
ct = χ(1− G) φ(1+ φ)nt − µφt
r
t
(1− G)µφ+ σ− χσ(1+ φ) + (1− χ)
(1− G)µφ+ σ
(1− G)µφ+ σ− χσ(1+ φ) c
o
t ,
and finally
ct = Θnnt −Θτtrt + σ¯−1σ
1
1− G c
o
t ,
where
σ¯−1 = σ−1(1− χ)(1− G) (1− G)µφ+ σ
φ(1− G)µ+ σ− χσ(1+ φ) ,
Θn = χ(1− G) (1+ φ)φ
φ(1− G)µ+ σ− χσ(1+ φ) ,
Θτ = χ(1− G) µφ
φ(1− G)µ+ σ− χσ(1+ φ) .
Differentiating, we get
ct = Θnn˙t −Θτ t˙rt + σ¯−1(it − r¯t − pit),
and using n˙t = c˙t + g˙t, we find the Euler equation
c˙t = σ˜−1(it − r¯t − pit) + Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt ,
where
σ˜−1 = σ¯
−1
1−Θn ,
Θ˜n =
Θn
1−Θn ,
Θ˜τ =
Θτ
1−Θn .
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The New Keynesian Philips Curve is unchanged
p˙it = ρpit − κ[ct + (1− ξ)gt].
J Proof of Proposition 13
Let Xt = [pit, ct]′, Bt = [−κ(1− ξ)gt, Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt ]′ = −κ(1− ξ)gtE1 +
[
Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt
]
E2
and A =
[
ρ −κ
−σ˜−1 0
]
. We have X˙t = AXt + Bt. The matrix A has one positive and
one negative eigenvalue. The negative eigenvalue is given by ν˜ = ρ−
√
ρ2+4κσ˜−1
2 and the
positive eigenvalue is given by ˜¯ν = ρ+
√
ρ2+4κσ˜−1
2 . The associated eigenvectors are Xν˜ =
[−ν˜σ˜, 1]′ and X ˜¯ν = [− ˜¯νσ˜, 1]′. The solution is
Xt = αν˜eν˜tXν˜ + κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gse−A(s−t)E1ds−
ˆ ∞
t
[
Θ˜n g˙s − Θ˜τ t˙rs
]
e−A(s−t)E2ds,
where X0 and αν solve the system of two equations in three unknowns
X0 − κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gte−AtE1dt +
ˆ ∞
0
[
Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt
]
e−AtE2dt = ανXν.
We pick the solution with αν = 0, just as in the “Fiscal Multipliers” paper. We get
Xt = κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gse−A(s−t)E1ds−
ˆ ∞
t
[
Θ˜n g˙s − Θ˜τ t˙rs
]
e−A(s−t)E2ds,
which we can rewrite as
Xt = κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gse−A(s−t)E1ds+
[
Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt
]
E2−
ˆ ∞
t
[
Θ˜ngs − Θ˜τtrs
]
Ae−A(s−t)E2ds.
Therefore we get
ct = Θ˜ngt + Θ˜τtrt + κ(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gsE2e−A(s−t)E1ds−
ˆ ∞
t
[
Θ˜ngs − Θ˜τtrs
]
E2Ae−A(s−t)E2ds.
Using E1 = 1( ˜¯ν−ν˜)σ˜ (Xν˜ − X ˜¯ν) and E2 = 1( ˜¯ν−ν˜)( ˜¯νXν˜ − ν˜Xν¯), we can rewrite this as
ct = Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt +
ˆ ∞
t
κσ˜−1
[
(1− ξ)gs + Θ˜ngs − Θ˜τtrs
]
e− ˜¯ν(s−t) e
( ˜¯ν−ν˜)(s−t) − 1
˜¯ν− ν˜ ds.
61
K Derivation of the Loglinearization for theHand-to-Mouth
Economy in Section 7.2
Assume that c∗t = 0 and i∗t = ρ. The loglinearized equations are
cot = (1− G)θ +
(1− α)(1− G)
σ
st,
yt = −α(1− χ)(1− G)θ + ct + α(1− G)ω
σ
st + gt,
nxt = −α(1− χ)(1− G)θ + α(1− G)
(ω
σ
− 1
)
st,
yt = nt,
c˙ot = −(1− G)σ−1(piH,t + αs˙t),
crt =
1
µ
(wt + nrt)− trt ,
cˆt = χcrt + (1− χ)cot ,
nt = χnrt + (1− χ)not ,
wt =
σ
1− G c
r
t + φn
r
t ,
wt =
σ
1− G cˆt + φnt.
Note that we have denoted total consumption of home agents by cˆt to avoid a confusion
with ct, the total consumption of home goods by private agents (both home and foreign).
We use the equations the last six equations to get
cˆt = Θnnt −Θτtrt + σ¯−1σ
1
1− G c
o
t .
Next we use nt = yt together with the goods market clearing condition to get
nt = −α(1− χ)(1− G)θ + α(1− G)ω
σ
st + cˆt + gt.
Differentiating the Backus-Smith condition, we get (we could have gotten this equation
directly from the definition of st)
s˙t = −piH,t.
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Now get can get to an equation involving total (home + foreign) consumption of the
domestic good ct = yt − gt which yields
ct = −α(1− χ)(1− G)θ + cˆt + α(1− G)ω
σ
st.
Differentiating, we get
c˙t = ˙ˆct +
α(1− G)ω
σ
s˙t,
then combining with the equation for cˆt
c˙t = Θnn˙t −Θτ t˙rt + σ¯−1σ
1
1− G c˙
o
t +
α(1− G)ω
σ
s˙t,
and replacing nt = cˆt + gt
c˙t = Θn( ˙ˆct + g˙t)−Θτ t˙rt + σ¯−1σ
1
1− G c˙
o
t +
α(1− G)ω
σ
s˙t,
and rearranging
c˙t = Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt + σ˜−1σ
1
1− G c˙
o
t +
1
1−Θn
α(1− G)ω
σ
s˙t,
then using the Euler equation for optimizers
c˙t = Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt − σ˜−1pit + α
[
−σ˜−1 + σ
−1
1−Θn (1− G)ω
]
s˙t,
and finally combining with the expression for s˙t = −pit
c˙t = Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt −
[
σ˜−1 − ασ˜−1 + α σ
−1
1−Θn (1− G)ω
]
pit,
which we can rewrite as
c˙t = Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt −
σ¯−1
1−Θn
[
1− α+ ασ
−1(1− G)
σˆ−1
ω
]
pit,
c˙t = Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt −
σ−1(1− χ)(1− G)
1−Θn
[
(1− α) (1− G)µφ+ σ
φ(1− G)µ+ σ− χσ(1+ φ) + αω
]
pit,
c˙t = Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt − σ˜−1pit,
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where
σ˜−1 = σ
−1(1− χ)(1− G)
1−Θn
[
(1− α) (1− G)µφ+ σ
φ(1− G)µ+ σ− χσ(1+ φ) + αω
]
,
i.e.15
σ˜ = σ
1−Θn
(1− χ)(1− G)
1
(1− α) (1−G)µφ+σ
φ(1−G)µ+σ−χσ(1+φ) + αω
.
This is our Euler equation.
To derive an initial condition, we use
cˆt = Θnnt −Θτtrt + σ¯−1σ
1
1− G c
o
t ,
ct = −α(1− χ)(1− G)θ + cˆt + α(1− G)ω
σ
st,
cot = (1− G)θ +
(1− α)(1− G)
σ
st,
and
nt = ct + gt,
to get
(1−Θn)ct = −α(1− χ)(1− G)θ + σ¯−1σθ +Θngt −Θτtrt + σ¯−1(1− α)st +
α(1− G)ω
σ
st,
and apply it at t = 0 with s0 = 0 to get
c0 =
[
σ¯−1 σ
1−Θn − α
(1− χ)(1− G)
1−Θn
]
θ + Θ˜ng0 − Θ˜τtr0.
Hence with complete markets, this boils down to the simple condition
c0 = Θ˜ng0 − Θ˜τtr0.
Finally we need to compute
mct = wt + pt − pH,t = wt + αst.
15We can check that when there are no hand-to-mouth consumers, this boils down to
c˙t = −σ−1(1− G) [1+ α(ω− 1)]pit,
which is exactly the expression that we found.
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We have
wt =
σ
1− G cˆt + φnt,
wt =
σ
1− G cˆt + φ(ct + gt),
which using
cˆt = ct + α(1− χ)(1− G)θ − α(1− G)ω
σ
st,
we can rewrite as
wt =
σ
1− G ct + σα(1− χ)θ − αωst + φ(ct + gt),
so that
wt + αst =
σ
1− G ct + σα(1− χ)θ + α(1−ω)st + φ(ct + gt),
which using[
σ¯−1(1− α) + αω (1− G)
σ
]
st = (1−Θn)ct + α(1− χ)(1− G)θ − σ¯−1σθ −Θngt +Θτtrt ,
we can rewrite as
wt + αst = (
σ
1− G + φ)ct + φgt + σα(1− χ)θ
+ α(1−ω) (1−Θn)ct + α(1− χ)(1− G)θ − σ¯
−1σθ −Θngt +Θτtrt
σ¯−1(1− α) + αω (1−G)σ
,
wt + αst =
[
σ
1− G + φ+
α(1−ω)(1−Θn)
σ¯−1(1− α) + αω (1−G)σ
]
ct
+
[
σα(1− χ) + α(1−ω)α(1− χ)(1− G)− σ¯
−1σ
σ¯−1(1− α) + αω (1−G)σ
]
θ
+
[
φ− α(1−ω)Θn
σ¯−1(1− α) + αω (1−G)σ
]
gt +
α(1−ω)Θτtrt
σ¯−1(1− α) + αω (1−G)σ
.
We can then replace this expression in to get the New Keynesian Philips Curve
p˙iH,t = ρpiH,t − λ(wt + αst).
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To summarize the system is summarized by
c˙t = Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt − σ˜−1piH,t,
p˙iH,t = ρpiH,t − λ(wt + αst),
c0 =
[
σ¯−1 σ
1−Θn − α
(1− χ)(1− G)
1−Θn
]
θ + Θ˜ng0 − Θ˜τtr0,
where
wt + αst =
[
σ
1− G + φ+
α(1−ω)(1−Θn)
σ¯−1(1− α) + αω (1−G)σ
]
ct
+
[
σα(1− χ) + α(1−ω)α(1− χ)(1− G)− σ¯
−1σ
σ¯−1(1− α) + αω (1−G)σ
]
θ
+
[
φ− α(1−ω)Θn
σ¯−1(1− α) + αω (1−G)σ
]
gt +
α(1−ω)Θτtrt
σ¯−1(1− α) + αω (1−G)σ
.
Complete markets (for optimizers) amounts to θ = 0. Define α˜ by
(1− α˜)(1− G) =
[
σ¯−1 σ
1−Θn − α
(1− χ)(1− G)
1−Θn
]
.
Define
κ˜ =
σ
1− G + φ+
α(1−ω)(1−Θn)
σ¯−1(1− α) + αω (1−G)σ
.
Define ξ˜ by
κ˜(1− ξ˜) =
[
φ− α(1−ω)Θn
σ¯−1(1− α) + αω (1−G)σ
]
.
And define ω˜ by
(1− G)σ˜α˜ω˜ = σα(1− χ) + α(1−ω)α(1− χ)(1− G)− σ¯
−1σ
σ¯−1(1− α) + αω (1−G)σ
.
Then we can rewrite the system as
p˙iH,t = ρpiH,t − κ˜(ct + (1− ξ)gt)− (1− G)λσ˜α˜ω˜θ,
c˙t = −σ˜−1piH,t + Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt ,
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with an initial condition
c0 = (1− G)(1− α˜)θ + Θ˜ng0 − Θ˜τtr0.
L Proof of Proposition 14
We treat the case where optimizers have access co complete markets. The system is
p˙iH,t = ρpiH,t − κ˜(ct + (1− ξ)gt),
c˙t = −σ˜−1piH,t + Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt ,
c0 = Θ˜g0 − Θ˜τtr0.
Let Xt = [piH,t, ct]′, Bt = [−κ˜(1− ξ)gt, Θ˜n g˙t− Θ˜τ t˙rt ]′ = −κ˜(1− ξ)gtE1+
[
Θ˜n g˙t − Θ˜τ t˙rt
]
E2
and A =
[
ρ −κ˜
−σ˜−1 0
]
. We have X˙t = AXt + Bt. The matrix A has one positive and
one negative eigenvalue. The negative eigenvalue is given by ν˜ = ρ−
√
ρ2+4κ˜σ˜−1
2 and
the positive eigenvalue is given by ˜¯ν = ρ+
√
ρ2+4κ˜σ˜−1
2 . The associated eigenvectors are
Xν˜ = [−ν˜σ˜, 1]′ and X ˜¯ν = [− ˜¯νσ˜, 1]′. The solution is
Xt = αν˜eν˜tXν˜ + κ˜(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gse−A(s−t)E1ds−
ˆ ∞
t
[
Θ˜n g˙s − Θ˜τ t˙rs
]
e−A(s−t)E2ds,
which we can rewrite as
Xt = αν˜eν˜tXν˜+ κ˜(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gse−A(s−t)E1ds+
[
Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt
]
E2−
ˆ ∞
t
[
Θ˜ngs − Θ˜τtrs
]
Ae−A(s−t)E2ds,
where X0 and αν˜ solve the system of three equations in three unknowns
X0− κ˜(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gte−AtE1dt−
[
Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt
]
E2 +
ˆ ∞
0
[
Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt
]
Ae−AtE2dt = αν˜Xν˜,
E′2X0 = Θ˜g0 − Θ˜τtr0.
This yields
−κ˜(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gte−AtE1dt +
ˆ ∞
0
[
Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt
]
Ae−AtE2dt = αν˜.
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We therefore have
ct =
[
−κ˜(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gte−AtE1dt +
ˆ ∞
0
[
Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt
]
Ae−AtE2dt
]
eν˜t
+ κ˜(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gsE′2e−A(s−t)E1ds−
ˆ ∞
t
[
Θ˜n g˙s − Θ˜τ t˙rs
]
E′2e−A(s−t)E2ds,
ct =
[
−κ˜(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gte−AtE1dt +
ˆ ∞
0
[
Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt
]
Ae−AtE2dt
]
eν˜t
+ κ˜(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gsE′2e−A(s−t)E1ds+
[
Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt
]−ˆ ∞
t
[
Θ˜ngs − Θ˜τtrs
]
E′2Ae−A(s−t)E2ds,
ct = Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt+[
−κ˜(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
0
gte−AtE1dt +
ˆ ∞
0
[
Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt
]
Ae−AtE2dt
]
eνt
+ κ˜(1− ξ)
ˆ ∞
t
gsE′2e−A(s−t)E1ds−
ˆ ∞
t
[
Θ˜ngs − Θ˜τtrs
]
E′2Ae−A(s−t)E2ds,
ct = Θ˜ngt − Θ˜τtrt+[
−
ˆ ∞
0
κ˜σ˜−1
[
(1− ξ)gs + Θ˜ngs − Θ˜τtrs
]
e− ˜¯νs e
( ˜¯ν−ν˜)s − 1
˜¯ν− ν˜ ds
]
eν˜t
+
ˆ ∞
t
κ˜σ˜−1
[
(1− ξ)gs + Θ˜ngs − Θ˜τtrs
]
e− ˜¯ν(s−t) e
( ˜¯ν−ν˜)(s−t) − 1
˜¯ν− ν˜ ds.
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